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In 2000, approximately 98,000 donors contributed more than $17 million to the 
Archdiocese of Boston’s Cardinal’s Appeal, marking the campaign’s most successful 
year to date.1 This annual appeal constitutes the principal source of income for the 
Archdiocese’s “Central Ministry” fund, which supports diocesan operations, faith 
formation and evangelization, outreach programs, social services for the disadvantaged 
and the poor, religious education programs, and low-income parishes. In 2001, the 
economic recession and the launching of a capital campaign in June 2001 led to a slight 
decrease in donors and contributions, but still more than 84,000 donors contributed nearly 
$16 million to the Cardinal’s Appeal.2 In 2002, however, the revenue raised by the 
Cardinal’s Appeal was literally cut in half, yielding only $8.6 million; in the course of 
one year, the Archdiocese lost over 39,000 donors.3  
The dramatic reduction in both revenue and number of donors to the Cardinal’s 
Appeal in 2002 indisputably resulted from the clergy sexual abuse scandal, which first 
came to light in January 2002. A decade later, however, the annual appeal has nearly 
returned to pre-crisis revenue levels, and the Archdiocese has regained thousands of 
donors. This thesis examines the ways in which the Archdiocese of Boston achieved this 
turn-around in its fundraising efforts. As the ensuing chapters demonstrate, the clergy 
abuse crisis forced the Archdiocese to confront traditional Catholic attitudes toward 
money and fundraising, attitudes that have historically limited the success of Catholic 
                                                
1 The capitalization of “archdiocese” was inconsistent in my sources. For the purposes of consistency, 
“archdiocese” will be capitalized in this thesis.  
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, “Ten Year Giving Summary, CA97 to CA05.”  
2 Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, “Ten Year Giving Summary, CA10 v. CA09 YTD.”  
3 “Ten Year Giving Summary, CA10 v. CA09 YTD.” 
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fundraising. In doing so, the Archdiocese took a number of unprecedented steps aimed at 
regaining the trust of donors; many of the changes the Archdiocese implemented 
represent the best practices in Catholic fundraising as well as in nonprofit fundraising. 
The thesis concludes by arguing that the Archdiocese’s implementation of best practices 
in Catholic fundraising—more specifically, an emphasis on ecclesiastical stewardship or, 
on giving as a theological duty—does not account for the recovery of the Cardinal’s 
Appeal. Instead, the Archdiocese’s commitment to best practices in nonprofit fundraising 
directly resulted in the impressive resurgence of the Cardinal’s Appeal. 
 
Origins of a Fundraising Disaster 
When asked to explain the basis for the immense losses in the Cardinal’s Appeal 
between 2001 and 2002, Ken Hokenson, the Chief Development Officer for the 
Archdiocese of Boston from 2001 to 2006, stated: “The biggest single negative has been 
the sexual misconduct situation. I wouldn’t be honest if I didn’t say that that is the most 
important factor.”4 The “situation” Hokenson references began for most Boston-area 
Catholics on January 6, 2002 when The Boston Globe published a front-page story 
entitled, “Church allowed abuse by priest for years.” According to the article, Cardinal 
Bernard F. Law, then Archbishop of Boston, and several bishops had repeatedly allowed 
former priest John J. Geoghan to transfer parishes despite their knowledge that Geoghan 
had previously sexually abused young parish members. 
Through examining public files of 84 pending lawsuits against Geoghan, the 
Globe was able to establish that Geoghan had been reassigned to six different parishes in 
                                                
4 Michael Paulson, “Refocused church seeking donations,” Boston Globe, December 22, 2002, 




34 years and had been accused of molesting upwards of 130 children.5 Geoghan’s 
abusive behavior began at Blessed Sacrament in Saugus, his first parish assignment 
following his 1962 ordination.6 In 1966, Geoghan received his second assignment at St. 
Bernard’s in Concord; this assignment only lasted seven months with no public 
explanation of the reason for his sudden departure.7 In 1967, Geoghan arrived at St. 
Paul’s in Hingham and abused young boys from several families during his seven-year 
tenure at the parish.8 When an uncle of one of the boys complained to Geoghan’s 
superiors, Geoghan was sent to Seton Institute in Baltimore as an in-patient for “sex 
abuse.”9 Yet, in 1974, after receiving a “clean bill of health” from Seton, Geoghan went 
to his fourth parish, St. Andrew’s in Jamaica Plain. Responsible for overseeing the altar 
boys and the Boy Scouts program, Geoghan molested seven boys from the same family.10 
When the pastor of another parish in the area confronted Geoghan in regard to the 
allegation made by a relative of the boys, Geoghan apparently simply said, “Yes, that’s 
all true.”11Although Geoghan was forced to leave St. Andrew’s and spend the next year 
on sick leave “for his compulsion,” the pastor of Saint Andrew’s at the time of Geoghan’s 
assignment at the parish told the Globe that Church officials never specified why 
Geoghan left St. Andrew’s.12  
In 1981, Geoghan was again medically cleared to return to parish service. While 
some psychiatrists still believed at the time that child molestation was curable, current 
                                                
5 Globe Spotlight Team, “Geoghan preferred preying on poorer children,” Boston Globe, January 7, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/010702_geoghan.htm (accessed November 16, 2011).  
6 Globe Spotlight Team, “Church allowed abuse by priest for years,” The Boston Globe, January 6, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/010602_geoghan.htm (accessed November 16, 2011).  
7 Spotlight Team, “Church allowed abuse.” 
8 Ibid.  
9  Ibid.   
10 Ibid.   
11 Ibid.   
12 Spotlight Team, “Church allowed abuse.” 
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specialists in child sexual abuse maintain that “it ought to have been apparent to the 
Archdiocese…that someone with Geoghan’s record of habitual sexual abuse should not 
have been returned to a parish.”13 Nonetheless, the Archdiocese sent him to his fifth 
parish, St. Brendan’s in Dorchester. According to a Globe interview with a teacher who 
worked at St. Brendan’s at this time, Geoghan was allowed to work chiefly with the 
parish’s children and First Communicants because Archdiocesan officials did not inform 
St. Brendan’s pastor about Geoghan’s history of sexual abuse.14  
In 1984, Cardinal Law removed Geoghan from St. Brendan’s after receiving 
complaints that Geoghan had abused children at the parish. Law then transferred 
Geoghan to St. Julia’s in Weston despite receiving a letter from Bishop John M. D’Arcy, 
one of his “top subordinates,” expressing concern with the assignment: “Fr. Geoghan has 
a history of homosexual involvement with young boys. I understand his recent abrupt 
departure from St. Brendan’s, Dorchester may be related to this problem.”15 As indicated 
by the pending lawsuits examined by the Globe, Geoghan abused at least 30 young boys 
in the nine years he served at St. Julia’s.16 During this time, Geoghan was repeatedly 
accused of molestation and, in 1989, he was forced to go on yet another sick leave. In 
1990, Law “signed off on a decision to return him” to St. Julia’s, and it is now known 
that he continued to abuse children at the parish until Law finally removed him from 
parish duty in 1993.17   
                                                
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.   
15 Letter from Bishop D’Arcy to Archbishop Bernard Law, in Betrayal, ed. by the Investigative Staff of The 
Boston Globe (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), 231.  
16 Spotlight Team, “Church allowed abuse.”  
17 Spotlight Team, “Geoghan preferred preying on poorer children.” 
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The transferring of Geoghan between parishes, however, was not the only 
incendiary component of the January 6 Globe story. The article also revealed that the 
Archdiocese had covered up over a hundred allegations against Geoghan and subsequent 
settlements with his victims: “Since the mid-1990s, more than 130 people have come 
forward with horrific childhood tales about how former priest John J. Geoghan allegedly 
fondled or raped them during a three-decade spree through a half-dozen Greater Boston 
parishes.”18 When victims’ lawyers filed allegations against the priest, most of these 
claims were settled in private, a preferable arrangement for the Archdiocese because it 
kept the “ugly truth under wraps.”19 Quiet settlements were also agreeable to most 
victims as it allowed them to receive financial compensation from the Archdiocese and 
maintain their privacy in a situation that many found shameful and embarrassing.20  
In response to the Globe report, Cardinal Law held a news conference on January 
9, 2002 during which he apologized for his actions related to Geoghan and instated a 
“zero tolerance policy” in Boston:  
With all my heart, I wish to apologize once again for the harm done to the victims 
of sexual abuse by priests…These days are particularly painful for the victims of 
John Geoghan. My apology to them and their families, and particularly to those 
who were abused in assignments which I made, comes from a grieving heart. I am 
indeed profoundly sorry… For the Archdiocese of Boston, I pledge a policy of 
zero tolerance for such behavior. Any priest known to have sexually abused a 
minor simply will not function as a priest in any way in this Archdiocese.21 
 
Yet, a few weeks later, the Globe published another disconcerting article that quickly 
negated any progress Law’s apology had made in mollifying angry parishioners. On 
January 31, the Globe revealed that the Archdiocese of Boston had “quietly settled child 
                                                
18 Spotlight Team, “Church allowed abuse by priest for years.”  
19 Betrayal, viii.  
20 Ibid.  
21  Law, Bernard. “My apology…comes from a grieving heart,” Boston Globe. January 9, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/011002_law_text.htm (accessed November 16, 2011).  
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molestations claims against at least 70 priests” since the early 1990s. Although it was 
difficult to identify the exact number of victims due to the extent of the secrecy 
surrounding the claims and settlements, the Globe estimated that the number exceeded 
200 people.22  
In less than a month, Boston-area Catholics learned two disturbing truths about 
their church’s leadership: the cardinal and his team of bishops had not only enabled one 
priest’s persistent sexual abuse but it had also kept an extensive pattern of clergy sexual 
abuse in the Archdiocese “under an extraordinary cloak of secrecy.”23 The crisis only 
worsened for the Archdiocese of Boston following the January 31 story, however, as 
hundreds of people contacted lawyers, prosecutors and the Globe claiming to have been 
abused by priests as children. After learning the extent of clergy sexual abuse in Greater 
Boston, many victims abandoned their fear of shame and their silence. According to 
David Clohessy, the national director of the Survivors Network of those Abused by 
Priests, as recently as the early 1990s “the most that victims who came forward could 
hope for was silence from others, if not ostracism in their parishes.”24 Yet, following the 
Globe disclosures in 2002, a “culture of comfort and safety” emerged as people realized 
the pervasiveness of clergy sexual abuse.25 By late February 2002, more than 300 people 
had contacted or hired attorneys; by the end of the year, more than 500 alleged victims of 
                                                
22  Globe Spotlight Team, “Scores of priests involved in sex abuse cases,” Boston Globe, January 31, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/013102_priests.htm (accessed November 16, 2011).  
23 Spotlight Team, “Scores of priests involved.”  
24 Walter V. Robinson, “Hundreds now claim priest abuse,” Boston Globe, February 24, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/022402_victims_spotlight.htm (accessed November 
16, 2011).  
25  Robinson, “Hundreds now claim priest abuse.”  
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clergy sexual abuse had filed claims seeking financial compensation from the 
Archdiocese of Boston.26  
Then, in early April, several Globe articles were published that resulted in 
“serious damage” to Cardinal Law’s “credibility.”27 On April 5, Law was added as a 
defendant to a lawsuit filed by fourteen victims of Rev. Joseph Birmingham on the 
charge that Law permitted Birmingham to “continue serving in parishes despite 
knowledge of his sexual abuse.” And, on April 8, the Globe, having obtained hundreds of 
formerly confidential church documents, revealed that Law had “repeatedly and 
knowingly allowed” Father Paul Shanley, an accused serial pedophile, “to hold posts that 
allowed him access to children.”28  
In the wake of the Globe revelations, more than 40,000 Catholics expressed their 
outrage at the Archdiocese’s mishandling of sexually abusive priests and their displeasure 
with Law in particular by withholding their donations to the Archdiocese. As noted 
earlier, the clergy abuse scandal cut the number of donors to the Cardinal’s Appeal and 
the revenue raised by this annual campaign literally in half. While parish collections fell 
by thirteen percent—in line with an eighteen percent decrease in Mass attendance—most 
individual parishes did not suffer significant financial losses as a direct result of the 
clergy abuse scandal.29 Instead, in the midst of the scandal, Catholics tended to continue 
giving to their parish out of a sense of loyalty to their congregation and to their pastor. As 
                                                
26  Robinson, “Hundreds now claim priest abuse.” Globe Spotlight Team, “The Financial Cost,” Boston 
Globe, http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/cost/  (accessed November 16, 2011).  
27 Michael Paulson, “Heavy blow to cardinal’s credibility,” Boston Globe, April 9, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/040902_analysis.htm (November 27, 2011).  
28 Paulson, “Heavy blow to cardinal’s credibility.”  
29 Steve Kurkjian, “Archdiocese cites $14m loss in central fund for 2002-03,” Boston Globe, April 3, 2004, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories5/040304_fund.htm (accessed November 16, 2011).  
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will be addressed in later chapters, many Boston-area parishes face serious financial 
challenges, but these issues predate the 2002 clergy abuse crisis.  
 
Laity Contributions Matter 
As the Archdiocese of Boston relies on laity contributions to the annual appeal to 
provide 50 percent of the income for its Central Ministries, such a tremendous loss of 
donors and their contributions in 2002 directly impacted the operations of the 
Archdiocese and the services and programs it supports. In 2003, as a direct result of the 
significant drop-off in giving the previous year, the Church cut spending on services for 
youth, family life, and ethnic apostolates from $11.7 million to $7.4 million and cut 
support for parochial schools from $4.6 million to $1.8 million.30 While Catholics in the 
wealthy suburbs that fall under the jurisdiction of the Archdiocese of Boston were not 
particularly affected by most of these cuts, Boston’s poorer Catholics—many of whom 
have benefited from a Catholic education or from services provided by the 
Archdiocese—directly experienced the consequences of the financial disaster prompted 
by the clergy abuse crisis.31 As John O’Keefe, associate professor at Boston College’s 
Lynch School of Education, noted, “When money gets scarce, it’s the poor who suffer 
difficulties disproportionately.”32 The collapse of the 2002 Cardinal’s Appeal directly 
impacted the Archdiocese’s ability to fulfill its mission, namely to provide spiritual and 
material support for its members.  
 
                                                
30 Michael Kurtz and Anand Vaishnav, “Catholic schools struggle in the city,” Boston Globe, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories4/030903_schools.htm (accessed November 16, 2011).  
31 Kurtz and Vaishnav, “Catholic schools struggle in the city.”  
32 Ibid.  
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The Plan of This Thesis  
In order to adequately serve the Catholic community in Boston, the Archdiocese 
needed to regain the trust of donors and subsequently their contributions to the annual 
appeal. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Archdiocese went about 
accomplishing this daunting task. Chapter 1 provides an in-depth discussion of the 2002 
Cardinal’s Appeal, analyzing Cardinal Law’s personal impact on the results of the 
Appeal as well as the specific motivations and rationales of those who withheld their 
donations. Chapter 2 comprises an overview of the basis for low Catholic giving in 
general, and then discusses the recommendations of Charles Zech, the preeminent scholar 
on Catholic fundraising in the United States, regarding the ways in which Catholic 
dioceses and parishes can increase contributions. Chapter 3 provides a detailed 
description of the substantial changes the Archdiocese implemented in terms of its 
fundraising practices in the years immediately following the crisis. Chapter 4 first 
evaluates these changes in the larger context of best practices in Catholic fundraising and 
nonprofit fundraising more generally, and then analyzes which changes were most 
effective for the Archdiocese of Boston. Chapter 5 concludes by describing the 
Archdiocese’s most recent efforts to increase the number of donors to the annual Appeal 










While the previous chapter described the tremendous loss of revenue and donors 
between 2001 and 2002, this chapter provides a more in-depth analysis of the 2002 
Cardinal’s Appeal—detailing Cardinal Law’s direct impact on the campaign, the specific 
rationales of those who stopped giving, and the extent to which withdrawn contributions 
influenced Law’s resignation. This chapter concludes with an overview of the disastrous 
financial situation Archbishop O’Malley inherited from Law upon his arrival in Boston in 
July 2003.   
 
The “Downside” of the Cardinal’s Appeal 
 
 In the aftermath of The Boston Globe articles that revealed the pervasive abuse of 
minors by priests and the cover-up by Cardinal Bernard Law and other members of the 
Boston hierarchy, the Catholic laity experienced a range of intense emotions: shock, 
anger, sadness, embarrassment, confusion. While Catholics were horrified by the notion 
that trusted priests had been sexually abusing children for decades, they were even more 
astounded by the revelation that bishops, and Cardinal Law in particular, knew what was 
happening and continually allowed such behavior to occur. As one parishioner articulated 
in an interview a few years later: “A lot of things were shocking. The extent of the 
scandal was shocking, but most shocking...were the implications for the hierarchy. There 
was clear evidence they knew about it and covered it up. That was the most shocking and 
distressing thing of all.”33  
Although a number of high-ranking bishops were involved in the cover-up, 
Cardinal Law received the brunt of the criticism and outcry due not only to his position as 
the leader of the Archdiocese but also due to reports of his personal involvement in 
                                                
33 William D’Antonio and Anthony Pogorelic, Voices of the Faithful: Loyal Catholics Striving for Change 
(New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2007), 14.  
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enabling the abuse to continue. On April 5, The Boston Globe reported Law was added as 
a defendant to a lawsuit filed by fourteen victims of Rev. Joseph Birmingham on the 
charge that Law permitted Birmingham to “continue serving in parishes despite 
knowledge of his sexual abuse.”34 When one of the victims approached Law in 1989 at 
Birmingham’s funeral and insisted that many men now needed counseling as a result of 
Birmingham’s abuse, the Cardinal allegedly responded, “We don't want to destroy the 
reputation of this fine man's ministry.”35 And, on April 8th, the Globe revealed that Law 
had “repeatedly and knowingly allowed” Rev. Paul Shanley, an accused serial pedophile, 
“to hold posts that allowed him access to children.”36 The article constituted a “heavy 
blow to the Cardinal’s credibility,” undermining Law’s insistent promises over the past 
four months that he “didn’t protect priests accused of misconduct,” that he “always acted 
on the best medical information available to him,” and that his “first priority [had] been 
the people priests were ordained to serve.”37 A poll conducted a few days after the 
Shanley article revealed that sixty percent of Massachusetts Catholics believed Law 
should resign.38  
While Cardinal Law now rarely left his Italian Renaissance mansion in Brighton, 
he did not resign.39 Instead, the same month that the Globe exposed his direct 
involvement in the scandal, Law made his annual pitch for the Cardinal’s Appeal. As he 
had done for years, the Cardinal appeared on Boston Catholic Television and asked 
                                                
34 Matt Carroll, “Law is new defendant in clergy abuse suit,” Boston Globe, April 5, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/040502_law_defendant.htm (accessed November 14, 
2011).  
35 Carroll, “Law is new defendant.”  
36 Michael Paulson, “Heavy blow to cardinal’s credibility,” Boston Globe, April 9, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/040902_analysis.htm (accessed November 14, 2011).  
37 Paulson, “Heavy blow to cardinal’s credibility.”  
38 Fred Kaplan, “60 percent in poll say Law should resign as archbishop,” Boston Globe, April 12, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/041202_lawpoll.htm, (accessed November 14, 2001).  
39Betrayal, 142.  
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Catholics to financially support the Archdiocese: “It is this offering which enables us to 
support the many good works of the Archdiocese - outreach to the poor and the sick, 
spreading our faith, works of evangelization - so we really look forward to your 
generous-hearted response to that appeal.”40  
Since 1984, Cardinal Law had been the face of the Cardinal’s Appeal—as the 
name suggests. Every spring, parishioners would receive a series of letters with the 
cardinal’s signature and his picture. Such letters alone garnered a significant number of 
contributions due to the cardinal’s popularity. For almost two decades, Cardinal Law was 
highly regarded in Boston, among Catholics and non-Catholics. Although many found 
him rather staid—he insisted on being referred to as “His Eminence”—Law earned 
widespread respect for a number of efforts, including: his support of affordable housing 
initiatives; his dedication to raising money for victims of disasters in Latin America; his 
commitment to ministering to the poor and the sick; his outreach to minority Catholics 
and immigrants; and his fervent condemnation of anti-Semitism. Catholic colleges 
consistently sought him out as a commencement speaker. 41 The White House “took his 
calls and valued his opinion.”42  
Until 2002, Catholics demonstrated their esteem for Law’s leadership through 
their contributions to the Cardinal’s Appeal. As a New York Times article noted, “A letter 
from the popular archbishop, featuring his photograph, was enough to attract significant 
                                                
40 Michael Paulson, “Cardinal makes annual pitch for funds,” Boston Globe, April 29, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/042902_law_funds.htm (accessed November 15, 
2011).  
41 Betrayal, 146.  
42 Ibid, 141. 
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donations.”43 Once Law became implicated in the scandal, however, many Catholics 
inevitably struggled to separate the Cardinal’s Appeal and its purpose from Law himself. 
As Damien DeVasto, the director of the Cardinal’s Appeal at the time, conceded: “[The 
Appeal] was tied to one personality, which was Cardinal Law. While that may have been 
successful in times past, the downside was that as the crisis in the Church became 
exposed, that personality took over the meaning of the appeal.”44  
The numbers for the 2002 Cardinal’s Appeal demonstrate to what extent Cardinal 
Law’s personal association with the Archdiocese’s annual appeal became a “downside.”  
The Archdiocese set its fundraising goal for 2002 at $16 million, the same amount the 
Appeal had garnered the previous year; it received only $8 million. At every giving level, 
there was a significant drop in the number of donors: those who gave less than $100 
dropped to 17,139 from 35,948 in 2001; those who gave $1,000 to $2,499 dropped to 
1,230 from 2,226; and those who gave $10,000 or more dropped to 39 from 78. The total 
number of donors to the Cardinal’s Appeal decreased by more than half, from 84,624 to 
40,737.45 As these numbers indicate, in the year of the clergy abuse scandal, the 
Cardinal’s letters suddenly failed to garner donations; instead thousands of disillusioned 
Catholics who had given to the Cardinal’s Appeal year after year now refused to support 
a campaign so closely aligned with the individual who had knowingly allowed multiple 
abusive priests to continue working alongside children. 
 
                                                
43 Julie Flaherty, “For Boston’s archdiocese, an appeal is rebranded,” New York Times, November 10, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/17/giving/in-the-churches-for-boston-s-archdiocese-an-appeal-is-
rebranded.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed November 14, 2011).  
44 Kristen Bremner,“Boston archdiocese changes appeal in wake of abuse scandals,” Direct Marketing 
News, http://www.dmnews.com/boston-archdiocese-changes-annual-appeal-in-wake-of-abuse-
scandals/article/81641/ (accessed November 10, 2011).  
45 Ten Year Giving Summary CA10 v. CA09 YTD.  
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Specific Motivations for Withholding Contributions  
 While their disapproval of Cardinal Law’s handling of the clergy sexual abuse 
crisis united these disillusioned Catholics, their specific reasons and motivations for 
withholding contributions varied.  
 
Dissociating from the Archdiocese 
The clergy abuse scandal alienated tens of thousands of loyal Catholics. Horrified 
by the details of the Law’s handling of sexually abusive priests, these Catholics who had 
consistently supported the Archdiocese of Boston through the Cardinal’s Appeal decided 
to cut all financial ties with the Archdiocese in 2002. Those interviewed for this project 
consistently reinforced the tremendous disillusionment Catholics experienced in the wake 
of The Boston Globe’s revelations, which prompted the withdrawal of financial support. 
Msgr. Frank Kelley, the pastor at Sacred Heart Parish in Roslindale, described this time 
as “very difficult” for his parishioners “because of the scope and dimension”: “There was 
a real sense of betrayal… a real sense that [the Catholic Church] [was] not going to 
recover from this; it was a serious blow.”46  Fr. Edward Vacek, Professor of Moral 
Theology at Boston College, articulated the disturbing realities that the crisis revealed: 
“Everything everyone thought about the Church was shattered: ‘The Church is 
trustworthy.’ No it ain’t. ‘The Church is a caretaker of children.’ No it ain’t. ‘The Church 
consists of all holy people.’ No it doesn’t.”47 And Scot Landry, the Secretary of 
Institutional Advancement at the Archdiocese from 2006 to 2010, noted Catholics’ 
genuine shock and disbelief at the hierarchy’s involvement in the scandal: “There was the 
                                                
46 Monsignor Frank Kelley, interview by author, Roslindale, MA, October 24, 2011.  
47 Edward Vacek, interview by author, Brookline, MA, August 4, 2011.  
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expectation that the bishops would do the right thing as the leaders of the archdiocese. 
People couldn’t understand why the bishops didn’t do something.”48  
While some of those who discontinued their contributions to the Cardinal’s 
Appeal also stopped attending Mass, many continued to support their parish, as suggested 
by the fact that individual parishes did not experience significant financial losses as a 
direct result of the clergy abuse crisis. This giving pattern illustrates parishioners’ sense 
of loyalty to their congregation and also their recognition that much of the responsibility 
for the clergy abuse crisis resided with the bishops at the Archdiocese as opposed to their 
local pastors. According to Fr. Richard Fitzgerald of St. Paul’s Parish in Wellesley, while 
parishioners might have initially felt impelled to withhold contributions to their parish as 
a way to voice their discontent with the Archdiocese, many ultimately asked themselves, 
“Why am I hurting my parish?” In addition, parishioners largely still trusted their pastor 
and his handling of their contributions. As Mary Cuddy Sutherland, the CPA at Sacred 
Heart Parish in Roslindale, noted in an interview, she gives to Sacred Heart because she 
“know[s] what the pastor is doing with that money,” an “important factor in [her] 
decision to contribute to any cause.”49 The crisis therefore appears to have prompted a 
change in giving patterns for thousands of Catholics. Frustrated and mistrustful of the 
Archdiocese, once-loyal supporters of the Cardinal’s Appeal started giving only to their 
local parish.  
 
Demanding the Resignation of Law 
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For other donors, the decision to withhold their contribution in 2002 represented 
their attempt to voice their desire for Cardinal Law’s resignation. Following Cardinal 
Law’s televised launch of the 2002 Cardinal’s Appeal in late April, Archdiocesan 
fundraisers received countless emails and letters from donors resolutely refusing to 
contribute to the Archdiocese until the cardinal resigned. For instance, one donor wrote to 
Kenneth Hokensen, the Chief Development Officer at the time, “I will not give anything 
as long as Cardinal Law is in Boston.”50 Many of Boston’s most loyal—and wealthiest—
patrons were also among those calling for the cardinal’s resignation, and using their 
financial assets to reinforce this stance. For instance, Jack Connors, one of Boston’s most 
influential philanthropists and once a close confidante of Cardinal Law, ultimately 
“called on Law to resign” and redirected his giving to “local causes, such as parishes and 
individual Catholic charities.”51  
This attempt to drive Cardinal Law’s resignation through withholding 
contributions reflects many Catholics’ acute realization in the aftermath of the crisis that 
their financial assets constituted their only voice within the hierarchical structure of the 
Catholic Church. As one lay Catholic interviewed by the Globe noted: “The Church 
doesn’t give you an opportunity to express your opinion, so refraining from contributing 
provides that opinion.”52 Although Canon Law technically allows for laity opinion in the 
governance of the Church, the American hierarchy largely has maintained a system of 
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Church governance in which the “clerical elite” makes decisions with minimal 
consultation of the laity.53   
The lack of collaboration between the hierarchy and the laity provides the basis 
for the well-known phrase associated with the historic role of the laity in the Catholic 
Church: “pray, pay, obey.” An essay written by Cardinal Aidan Gasquet at the turn of the 
20th century illustrates this caricature with a simple anecdote:  “An inquirer…asked a 
priest what was the position of the laymen in the Catholic Church. ‘The layman has two 
positions,’ answered the priest. ‘He kneels before the altar; that is one. And he sits below 
the pulpit; that is the other.’”54 Cardinal Gasquet, however, notes that the priest forgot 
one position: “the priest also puts his hand in [the layman’s] purse.”55 The “pray, pay, 
obey” dictum, indicating the laity’s relative powerlessness within the governance of the 
Church, derives from the Tridentine or Roman Catechism, commissioned by the Council 
of Trent in order to counter those who attempted to undermine the Catholic faith during 
the Protestant Reformation.56 The document consistently emphasizes the authority of the 
clergy; the section “Communion of Good Works” provides a particularly illustrative 
example: “To each member of the Church is also assigned his own peculiar office. As 
some are appointed apostles, some teachers, but all for the common good; so to some it 
belongs to govern and teach, to others to be subject and to obey.”57 That Pope Pius X 
(1903-1914) echoed this statement in the early 20th century—“the one duty of the 
multitude is to allow themselves to be led, and like a docile flock, to follow the 
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Pastors”—demonstrates the long-standing influence and authority of the Tridentine 
Catechism.58 Until the Second Vatican Council, held between 1962 and 1965, most 
Catholics largely accepted such “vertical” governance; at both the diocesan and parish 
level, the ordained leadership “made all major and minor decisions and passed them 
downwards.”59  
The Second Vatican Council, however, sought to condemn such exclusion of the 
laity in Church governance. The work of influential European theologians, Gerard Philips 
and Yves Congar in particular, served as the impetus for the Council Fathers’ 
reconsideration of the laity’s role in the Church. In his 1953 work Lay People in the 
Church, Congar explored the notion of a “theology of the laity.”60 He ultimately argued 
that the “layperson is called through baptism and confirmation to a direct evangelization 
of the world that is exercised independently of the hierarchical apostolate”; while their 
responsibilities differ, both ordained priests and the laity possess an equally important 
role in the governance of the Church.61 Philips expressed a similar argument regarding 
the theological significance of the laity in his 1955 The Role of the Laity in the Church. 
As R. Scott Appleby paraphrases Philips’ essential points: “If the laity are seen ‘merely 
as an inferior part of a well-organized society,’ then they are condemned to passivity, and 
‘we would have no Christianity.’ On the contrary, baptism and confirmation bring 
laypersons into the ‘laos or people of God.’”62   
Several of the documents to emerge from the Second Vatican Council—Christus 
                                                
58 Pope Pius X qtd. in Pope, “Introduction,” Common Calling: The Laity and Governance of the Catholic 
Church, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press), 6.  
59 Charles Zech, Listening to the People of God: Closing, Rebuilding, and Revitalizing Parishes (Mahwah: 
Paulist Press, 2008), 7.  
60 Congar, Lay People, xi  
61 Appleby, “From Autonomy to Alienation,”100. 
62  Ibid, 100-101.  
Salmanowitz 19 
 
Dominus (Decree on the Bishops’ Pastoral Office), Apostolicam Actuositatem (Decree on 
the Apostolate of the Laity), Lumen Gentium (Dogmatic Constitution of the Church)— 
suggest that Congar and Philip’s theological work directly influenced the Council Fathers 
in their attempt to “renew and update the Church for the sake of the gospel.”63 The 
Council developed a new way of viewing the Church—namely as the “Body of Christ,” 
consisting of both the ordained priesthood and the laity.64  
With the focus now on the collective nature of the Catholic Church, not only were 
the pastors expected to include the laity in the governance of the Church but the laity was 
also expected to participate: “By reason of the knowledge, competence, or preeminence 
that they have, the laity are empowered—indeed sometimes obliged to manifest their 
opinion on the things which pertain to the good of the Church.”65 While the Council was 
careful not to suggest that the Church was a democracy, it did assert in the Decree on the 
Apostolate of the Laity that “bishops, pastors of parishes, and other priests of both 
branches of the clergy should keep in mind…that the laity also have their own roles in 
building up the Church”66; to this end, the hierarchy was instructed to “willingly use [the 
laity’s] prudent advice and confidently assign duties to them in the service of the Church, 
leaving them freedom and scope for acting.”67 The Vatican II decrees resulted in the 
formation of lay councils at the diocesan and parish levels in the 1960s and 1970s, and, in 
1983, the Code of Canon Law was revised to include the requirement that each diocese 
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establish a finance council presided over by the diocesan bishop or his delegate.68  
Extensive cooperation and dialogue between the hierarchy and the laity, however, 
has significantly diminished in recent years. As Appleby articulates in his essay “From 
Autonomy to Alienation,” the reforms prompted by Vatican II “now look distressingly 
like a period piece.”69 Several factors have likely contributed to the present lack of 
collaboration between the Catholic hierarchy and the laity: the clergy’s unwillingness to 
relinquish its power; the passivity and apathy among much of the laity; and the Council’s 
failure to provide adequate practical suggestions for implementing practices that foster 
collaboration between the laity and the clergy.70 The aftermath of the clergy abuse crisis 
in Boston acutely illustrates the long-term ineffectiveness of the Vatican II laity reforms. 
With no formal body for the laity to express their opinions, money constituted the only 
way in which Catholics knew their opinion would be heard at the very least.  
 
Cardinal Law Resigns  
On December 13, 2002, Pope John Paul II accepted Cardinal Law’s resignation as 
the Archbishop of Boston. It remains unclear, however, to what extent the withdrawal of 
contributions actually influenced the cardinal’s resignation. Throughout the year, Law 
had given no indication that he intended to resign; on the contrary, as late as November, 
Law’s spokesperson told The Boston Globe, “[Cardinal Law] has made it clear he’s going 
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to continue in his ministry and that’s what he’s doing.”71 His sudden resignation in 
December therefore does not appear to reflect the Archdiocese’s response to the loss of 
donors. Instead, it seems likely that further disclosures of Law’s direct involvement in the 
clergy abuse scandal finally impelled Law to relinquish his role as the leader of the 
Catholic Church in Boston.  
On December 4, the Globe reported that newly released Church records 
demonstrated that Law and other Church officials “quietly transfer[ed] rogue priests to 
other parishes and treat[ed] them with a gentleness and sensitivity apparently unshaken 
by the heinous allegations against them.”72 For instance, in 1984, Law learned that Father 
Thomas Forry was not only sexually involved with a woman but was also sexually 
abusing the woman’s son; nevertheless, in 1988, Law appointed Forry as a full-time 
Army chaplain.73 And, in 1999, Law wrote to an abusive priest noting the possibility of 
the priest’s return to ministry due to the “wisdom [that] emerges from difficult 
experience.”74 Five days after the public learned of these damning Church records, Law 
flew to Rome to seek the advice of Vatican officials regarding how he should handle the 
worsening clergy abuse scandal.75  
 While Law was in Rome, many Boston-area priests sought to convey to the 
Vatican that Cardinal Law’s resignation was critical for the healing of the Archdiocese of 
Boston.  On December 9, 58 priests signed a letter calling on Law to resign and citing 
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their collective “loss of confidence” in Law as Boston’s “spiritual leader.”76 Although the 
priests who signed the letter acknowledged the difficultly of rebelling against a leader 
who they had “pledged to obey” when they were ordained, they viewed the letter as a 
necessary action for the “good of the Church.”77 As one priest who signed the letter 
articulated, “This institution is limping miserably. Our ability to be effective has 
practically ceased. It’s impossible to fundraise. And any of us who work with young 
people are enormously compromised.”78  
Four days after this letter was delivered to the cardinal’s residence in Brighton, 
the Vatican announced the resignation of Cardinal Law in a “brief bulletin.”79 The 
Vatican provided no specific reason for Law’s resignation, and the Pope issued no public 
statement; it is therefore unclear whether the bishops’ letter was a significant factor. Law 
himself released only a short statement of apology: “To all those who have suffered from 
my shortcomings and mistakes, I both apologize to them and beg forgiveness. The 
particular circumstances of this time suggest a quiet departure.”80 The Catholic 
community in Boston reacted to the announcement with both sadness and hope. James 
Post, the president of Voice of the Faithful (VOTF), a group founded in February 2002 in 
Wellesley by Catholics distressed by the Archdiocese’s handling of clergy sexual abuse, 
articulated the conflicted sentiments of many Catholics in an interview with the Globe: 
“This is a terrible day in terms of the history of the Church because these events have 
brought the Church to its knees, and the departure of Cardinal Law is a symbol of all that. 
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But it’s also a day that we have to be hopeful that a healing process can begin that was 
not possible with Cardinal Law here.”81  
 
A New Leader for Boston Catholics 
Bishop Richard G. Lennon served as the apostolic administrator for the 
Archdiocese of Boston until the Vatican chose a new archbishop. Lennon continually 
vowed his commitment to facilitating healing processes for victims of clergy abuse and 
for the larger Church in Boston; nevertheless, his tenure as the interim leader of the 
Archdiocese of Boston was marred by his inability to reach a settlement agreement with 
lawyers of clergy abuse victims. On July 1, 2003, a little over seven months after the 
resignation of Cardinal Law, the Vatican announced that Bishop Seán O’Malley would 
become the sixth archbishop of Boston at the end of the month. Most Boston Catholics 
responded to the announcement with enthusiasm and optimism due not only to 
O’Malley’s experience dealing with clergy abuse scandals but also to the “change of 
order” his appointment signaled.82  
Born in Ohio in 1944, O’Malley received both a master’s degree in religious 
education and a doctorate degree in Spanish and Portuguese literature from Catholic 
University of America.83 Ordained in 1970 and consecrated as a bishop in 1984, he 
served as the Bishop of the Dioceses of Saint Thomas in the Virgin Islands for close to 
twelve years.84 In 1992, he was appointed Bishop of Fall River, Massachusetts to handle 
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the fallout from revelations that one of the diocese’s priests, Rev. James R. Porter, was a 
serial pedophile.85 Another clergy abuse crisis—this time with two previous bishops 
resigning after they were accused of abusing minors themselves—brought O’Malley to 
Palm Springs, Florida in the fall of 2002.86 In interviews for the Globe following the 
Vatican’s July 1 announcement, Catholics in both Palm Springs and Fall River spoke of 
O’Malley in very positive terms: “He brought a sense of calm”; “I don't think they could 
have chosen anyone so kind with the people, so easy to talk to”; “what you see is what 
you get in terms of Bishop O'Malley.”87  
As a brother of the Capuchin Franciscan order—a religious order that demands 
commitment to a simple, austere lifestyle and emphasizes missionary work—O’Malley 
also differed markedly from Law. Whereas Law embraced the “trappings of princely 
power,” O’Malley in his previous posts preferred to be called by his first name, wore the 
brown robe and sandals characteristic of Franciscan friars, and lived very simply.88 The 
perceptible differences between Law and O’Malley fostered optimism among Boston 
Catholics who recognized in O’Malley’s past assignments the potential for real reform 
within the Archdiocese of Boston. As Neal Finnegan, the chairman of Catholic Charities 
of Boston, noted in early July 2003: “You just sense the optimism. Boston was the 
lightning rod for the scandal. It would be nice for us to be the lightning rod for restoring 
the good things the Church does.”89  
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On July 30, 2003, Bishop O’Malley formally became the archbishop of Boston, 
and his immediate actions earned him praise and fostered cautious confidence in his 
ability to rehabilitate the Archdiocese. Since the announcement of his appointment, 
O’Malley had vowed that settling abuse claims was his “top priority.”90 O’Malley 
signaled his commitment to this promise when he offered a $55 million settlement to the 
alleged victims of clergy sexual abuse on August 8, his ninth full day as archbishop. In 
response to the offer, victims’ lawyers reacted positively, noting especially the “change in 
attitude, tone and methodology” of the Archdiocese in dealing with abuse settlements.91 
On October 21, the Globe reported that more than 80 percent of the 552 plaintiffs— the 
necessary number of people needed for an agreement to be “binding and final”—had 
agreed to an $85 million out-of court-settlement, a $30 million increase from O’Malley’s 
initial offer. 92  
 
A Financial Crisis  
Having accomplished the critical task of settling the pending clergy abuse cases, 
O’Malley now focused on dealing with the staggering financial situation of his 
Archdiocese: as of December 2003, the Central Ministry, comprising the Archdiocese’s 
central operations and fifty ministries, was operating with a deficit of nearly $14 million, 
a direct result of the decline in laity contributions; dozens of parishes were operating in 
the red due to problems that had been plaguing the Archdiocese for decades such as 
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changing demographics and increased cost of living for clergy members; the $85 million 
settlement had to be paid to the clergy sexual abuse plaintiffs before Christmas; and 
finally, the Archdiocese had an outstanding debt of $37 million to the Knights of 
Columbus, an organization which had advanced funds to the Archdiocese in September 
2002 to cover expenses in the wake of the dramatic drop in donations.93  
Given the impending Christmas deadline, O’Malley first devised a financing plan 
to cover the $85 million in settlement costs. On December 3, 2003, O’Malley announced 
that the Archdiocese would initially be taking out one or two short-term loans to fund the 
settlement.94 In order to reimburse the lenders, the Archdiocese would use funds from an 
expected settlement with the Archdiocese’s insurance companies and would sell the 
cardinal’s residence in Brighton, a four-story Italianate mansion. Although the 
Archdiocese maintained that there was no “symbolic” significance to the sale, many 
“ordinary Catholics” viewed the sale as further evidence of O’Malley’s commitment to 
change and reform; as James Post of VOTF noted: “It shows Archbishop O’Malley’s 
willingness to do what many people thought was unthinkable: to sell the jewel in the 
property assets of the Archdiocese.”95 In late April 2004, the Archdiocese announced that 
it had sold most of its headquarters in Brighton, which included the cardinal’s residence, 
to Boston College for $107.4 million.96  
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In January 2004, O’Malley issued a statement regarding “parish 
reconfiguration.”97 Citing the disrepair of many parish buildings, an aging clergy, and 
the fact that over one third of parishes in the Archdiocese were operating in the red, 
O’Malley announced that the Archdiocese would be closing sixty parishes. 
Anticipating the outcry from parishioners who had been baptized, confirmed, and 
married in these parishes, O’Malley emphasized that parish reconfiguration was an 
unavoidable action: “I am profoundly aware of the emotion the announcement of the 
closing of a parish evokes.  It means the loss of a spiritual home…I wish there was 
some way that all of these wonderful houses of life and prayer could remain open and 
alive and full.  But there is not.”98 O’Malley also stressed that the parish closures 
were in no way connected with financing the clergy abuse settlement; instead, he 
noted that the funds from the future sale of parish assets would allow the Archdiocese 
“to financially support as needed the parishes and schools that do remain in the 
Archdiocese as well as to recapitalize our pension and medical funds.”99  
 
Fundraising Becomes Critical 
While the Archdiocese anticipated paying off its debt to the Knights of Columbus 
by eventually selling more non-parish Church property, it needed to overcome the $14 
million deficit in the Central Ministry through increased laity contributions to the 
Cardinal’s Appeal. According to the Archdiocese’s annual report for the 2003 fiscal year, 
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the deficit had already forced the Archdiocese to cut spending in 2003 on social services 
from $11.7 million in 2002 to $7.4 million and on parochial schools from $4.6 million to 
$1.8 million.100 Given that the annual Appeal funds fifty percent of the Central Ministry’s 
budget, the Archdiocese clearly needed to increase donations to the appeal in the 2004 
fiscal year in order to prevent further spending cuts.101  
The clergy abuse scandal clearly rendered fundraising a daunting task for the 
Archdiocese; as this chapter demonstrated, the Archdiocese’s handling of clergy abuse 
cases had resulted in thousands of disillusioned donors—the Archdiocese’s most loyal 
among them. Regaining the trust and financial support of these donors would require 
smart and effective fundraising. As the next chapter discusses, however, Catholic 
dioceses and parishes have historically struggled with successful fundraising. While one 
may argue that the fact that the Archdiocese of Boston managed to garner $17 million in 
2000 constitutes success, this figure definitely did not cover all of the expenses incurred 
by the Central Ministry that year—resulting in a deficit of $10 million. This problem 
extends beyond the Archdiocese of Boston; as Jack Connors once remarked at a national 
conference on Catholic fundraising, “Our faith has many strengths, but fundraising is not 
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Issues in Catholic Fundraising  
 
Among Christians in the United States, Catholics on average give less to their 
church than their counterparts in other Christian denominations, a situation that derives 
from the way in which the Catholic Church traditionally has raised money for its material 
needs. This chapter begins with a description of Catholic giving relative to Protestant 
giving, and then describes the reasons for low Catholic giving. The chapter concludes 
with a review of the recommendations of the economist Charles Zech for how Catholic 
dioceses and parishes can increase contributions from its constituents.  
 
A History of Low Giving  
 
 For decades, Catholics have “contribut[ed] less money to their churches 
than…members of nearly every other major US religion.”103 According to the 1987 
“benchmark” study by the Rev. Andrew Greeley and Bishop William McManus, in the 
1960s, Protestants and Catholics gave about two percent of their income to their religion; 
by the 1980s, a different pattern had emerged: while mainline Protestant giving as a 
percent of income remained at about 2.2 percent, Catholic giving as a percent of income 
had dropped to 1.2 percent.104  Several subsequent surveys also demonstrated this 
perceptible “giving gap” between Catholics and Protestants.105   
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  The disparity between Protestant and Catholic giving levels was initially 
attributed to the lower socio-economic status and the “poor immigrant backgrounds” of 
American Catholics as compared to Protestants.106 An assessment of Catholic and 
Protestant income levels, however, indicated the inaccuracy of this interpretation. As 
Greeley explains in his 1987 book Catholic Contributions: Sociology and Policy:  
The average American Catholic’s contribution to the church, as a proportion of 
income, has declined because Catholics contributions have not kept pace with 
inflation and with the rise in Catholic income. Thus, U.S. Catholics contributed 
an average of $164 to the church in 1963 out of an annual average income of         
$7,645. In 1984, their contributions had doubled to $320 but their income almost 
quadrupled to $27,500.107  
 
By 1987, the annual household incomes of Catholics and Protestants were virtually 
equivalent, thereby completely negating the argument that “Catholics give less…because 
that’s all they can afford.”108 As a result, other theories emerged: Greeley argued that 
Catholics do not give as much to their church as Protestants because Catholic are 
“alienated from the Church hierarchy” regarding the Church’s teachings on social issues, 
such as the use of birth control—an issue that arose in the late 1960s, the same time that 
the “giving gap” between Protestants and Catholic became perceptible.109 Other 
researchers explained low Catholic giving by pointing to seemingly unique characteristics 
of the Catholic Church, such as the fact that Catholic congregations are “larger on 
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average” than Protestant congregations and that Catholics do not give as much to their 
diocese or parish because they tend to send their children to Catholic schools.110  
  These theories were ultimately found to be inaccurate by the American 
Congregational Giving Study (ACGS), a large project commissioned by the Lilly 
Endowment—a foundation dedicated to “supporting the causes of religion, education and 
community development”—to identify the strongest determinants of individual giving to 
churches across denominations.111 In order to ascertain the determinants, the ACGS 
research team conducted field visits with 125 randomly selected parishes in five Christian 
denominations and sent surveys to a random sample of 30 members from each parish.  
The five denominations comprised the Roman Catholic Church, the Assemblies of God, 
the Southern Baptist Convention, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, and the 
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A).  
  While the ACGS denied the legitimacy of “factors widely believed to be 
responsible” for low Catholic giving relative to Protestants, it revealed factors that 
actually do explain the giving differences between Catholics and Protestants.112 In 2000, 
Charles Zech, a member of the ACGS research team and an economist who studies 
Christian giving, published a landmark study in which he presents and explains the 
relevant ACGS data in order to elucidate the basis for low Catholic giving. 
 
 
                                                
110 Dean R. Hoge et. al, “Giving in Five Denominations,” in Financing American Religion, ed. Mark 
Chaves and Sharon L. Miller (Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press, 1999), 7.  
111 Lilly Endowment, “The Endowment,” Lilly Endowment Inc., 
http://www.lillyendowment.org/theendowment.html (accessed October 12, 2011).  
112  Hoge et al, “Giving in Five Denominations,” 7.   
Salmanowitz 32 
 
The Real Reasons for Low Catholic Giving 
  Using the ACGS data, Zech demonstrates in Why Catholics Don’t Give and What 
Can Be Done About It that low Catholic giving derives largely from (1) the Church’s 
failure to commit itself to financial transparency and accountability and (2) traditional 
Catholic attitudes toward money and fundraising relative to Protestants.  
 
Financial Transparency and Accountability 
In a series of related questions, the majority of Catholics in the ACGS expressed 
dissatisfaction with the degree of financial accountability and transparency at both the 
denominational (diocesan) and parish level. When asked whether they thought they had 
sufficient information about their denomination’s handling and allocation of funds, only 
about one third of Catholics in the study agreed that there was adequate disclosure—
relative to 46 percent of Lutherans and Presbyterians and more than 50 percent of 
Assemblies of God and Southern Baptists.113 Similarly, when asked whether their 
denominational leaders were adequately accountable to members regarding the allocation 
of contributions, only about 44 percent of Catholics either strongly or moderately agreed 
that their denominational leaders were adequately accountable; while Presbyterians 
responded in the same way, much larger percentages of Assemblies of God, Southern 
Baptists, and Lutherans believed that their denominational leaders were adequately 
accountable.114 At the parish level, only 53 percent of Catholics believed they possessed 
enough information regarding the handling of funds, relative to 70 percent of the 
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respondents in the four Protestant denominations.115 In addition, less than fifty percent of 
Catholics believed they possessed enough influence in parish financial decision-making, 
relative to nearly 70 percent of the respondents in each of the Protestant denominations in 
the study.116 
  A lack of financial openness in Catholic dioceses and parishes derives from the 
Catholic Church’s hierarchal ecclesiology and history of top-down management. As 
discussed in the previous chapter regarding the limited opportunities for the laity to voice 
their opinions, the hierarchal ecclesiology of Catholicism inherently limits extensive lay 
involvement in matters related to the finances of one’s diocese and individual parish.117 
As Zech explains, until Vatican II, “whatever ‘Father said’ became unquestioning parish 
policy, often simply because ‘Father said it.’ It didn’t seem to matter whether the issue 
concerned faith and morals, liturgies, parish spending, or even which political candidates 
to endorse.”118 While Catholics’ unquestioning acceptance of this management style 
began to dissipate after the Second Vatican Council explicitly condoned and encouraged 
lay involvement in the governance of the Church, the tradition of excluding the laity from 
such matters as the creation of budgets and the allocation of funds endures: “Some 
pastors still view themselves as the sole decision-maker in the parish and resent ‘lay 
intrusion’…just because a parish claims on paper to have a parish council or a finance 
council doesn’t necessarily mean that shared decision-making is occurring.”119  
Catholics’ satisfaction regarding the financial openness of their diocese or parish 
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directly affects their decision to donate. At both the diocesan and parish level in the 
ACGS, Catholics contributed more when they believed they possessed sufficient 
information on how their contributions were used.120 Such responses to the ACGS 
questions reveal that a lack of openness regarding Church finances is incompatible with 
the expectations of today’s Catholic donors. Especially among the post-Vatican II 
generation, or the generation of Catholics who grew up in an “era of cynicism towards 
both institutions and authority,” current and prospective donors to the Church are 
concerned with how their contributions are being used and are “much more willing today 
to ask questions” about the handling of Church funds.121 
 
Catholic Attitudes toward Money and Fundraising 
According to Zech, the Church’s fundraising efforts are further hampered by the 
way in which Catholic leaders at the diocesan and parish level articulate their fundraising 
appeals relative to Protestant leaders. In Protestant denominations, pastors tend to 
emphasize the notion of “stewardship” when asking for contributions. In secular 
fundraising parlance, stewardship refers to the responsible management of resources; for 
instance, stewardship offices are responsible for acknowledging donors' gifts and 
communicating how the money has been used by the organization. In ecclesiastical 
parlance, however, stewardship is a theological term, referring to the “giving of time, 
talent and treasure to one’s church in recognition of God’s gifts.” Although ecclesiastical 
stewardship is not limited to the realm of financial giving, it is a way of “lifting the 
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discussion of money to a spiritual level.”122 Therefore, churches that emphasize 
stewardship in their fundraising appeals frame giving in explicitly theological terms, 
characterizing one’s financial contribution as an act of “returning to God a portion of the 
bounty that God has given us.”123 Conversely, when you do not support your church, you 
are not only neglecting the material needs of the church but you are also neglecting to 
engage in a just relationship with God.  
In contrast to Protestant denominations, the Catholic Church has traditionally not 
framed their fundraising appeals in the language of ecclesiastical stewardship.124 Instead, 
the Church is very practical in its fundraising appeals; diocesan leaders and pastors tend 
to stress the costs of diocesan or parish programs and services over any theological 
obligations. For instance, an appeal from the pastor of Sacred Heart Parish in Roslindale 
focuses on the maintenance needs of the church building: “needed repairs include…our 
sound system in the upper church ($21,000), the steeple of our church needs repair 
($15,000)…the furnace pipes for the convent have given out ($50,000), the roof in the 
rectory…had to be replaced ($18,000)…I come to you to ask your generosity once again 
to continue our works among so many people in Roslindale.”125  
The fundamental difference in the way that Protestants and Catholics frame the 
importance of giving likely derives from the theological significance historically 
associated with money in each denomination. In The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of 
Community, John Tropman distinguishes between the “money orientation” of the 
“Protestant ethic,” a concept first introduced by Max Weber, and the “money orientation” 
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of the “Catholic ethic,” a concept put forth by Tropman in response to Weber's The 
Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism.126 In the Protestant ethic, money indicates 
“inner election and thus sacred status.”127 As Weber argues in The Protestant Ethic, this 
outlook toward money originated in 16th and 17th century Puritan churches and sects, 
which include Calvinists (today’s Presbyterians), Methodists, Congregationalists, 
Baptists, Quakers and Mennonites. While Puritans condemned the “pursuit of wealth for 
its own sake,” they understood wealth and worldly success as evidence of their salvation: 
“In no other religion was the pride of the predestined aristocracy of the saved so closely 
associated with...the idea that success in rationalized activity demonstrates God’s 
blessings as in Puritanism.”128  
Conversely, in the “Catholic ethic,” the possession of money is not emblematic of 
one’s “sacred status.”129 Instead, money is merely “instrumental,” providing a “means to 
an end.” Or, as Tropman explains, the Catholic “money orientation” is similar to a 
bowling score: “A bowling score measures success at bowling. It would never be 
considered to indicate moral character…In the Catholic ethic tradition, money…is a tool 
to provide necessary goods and services. It is not, however, a signal or sign of divine 
interest.”130 Thus, Catholics do not view the absence of wealth or poverty as 
“shameful.”131 According to Tropman, this view of money and wealth derives from the 
culture of ancient Israel, the culture out of which Catholicism emerged. The earliest 
                                                
126 John E. Tropman, The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Community (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2002), 46-7.  
127 Stephen Kalberg, “Introduction to The Protestant Ethic,” in The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of 
Capitalism by Max Weber (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001), xxxvii. 
128 Kalberg, “Introduction to The Protestant Ethic,” xxxvii. 
129 Tropman, The Catholic Ethic, 47.  
130 Ibid, 51. 
131 Ibid, 46.  
Salmanowitz 37 
 
Christians lived in a “noncash economy, in which other goods were considered sacred”; 
bread and wine—the “staples of life” and the fundamental components of the Eucharist—
possessed sacrality, as opposed to money. 132 In addition, a general wariness toward 
money characterized the “dominant ethos” of the early Church: “There was a firm 
tradition that God was a protector of the poor. God does not show favoritism to the 
rich.”133 Regardless of the specific reason for Catholics’ “money orientation,” however, 
such a nonreligious attitude toward money and wealth arguably helps to explain the lack 
of an emphasis on the theological importance of giving in Catholic dioceses and parishes. 
As this description of the “Catholic ethic” indicates, Catholics simply do not associate 
God with their worldly success. Therefore, the idea that financially supporting one’s 
church is about “returning to God a portion of the bounty that God has given us” does not 
resonate with Catholic tradition.134  
The pragmatic attitude of Catholic leaders toward giving likely derives not only 
from tradition but also from their discomfort with fundraising. In a recent Boston 
Business Journal article, Cardinal O’Malley captured the typical attitude of clergymen 
toward fundraising and money in general: “I think most priests don’t enjoy fundraising. 
You get up and do what’s got to be done.”135 While it certainly does not seem likely that 
Protestant pastors enjoy discussing money or feel at ease asking their parishioners for 
money, Catholic pastors tend to experience discomfort with this topic to a higher degree 
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than their Protestant counterparts. In interviews conducted by Christina Smith and 
Michael Emerson for Passing the Plate: Why American Christians Don’t Give Away 
More Money, several Catholic pastors noted their uneasiness talking about money when 
they themselves have never had to handle personal finances because they live in the 
parish rectories and are almost entirely supported by the congregation or the diocese; as 
one Catholic pastor articulated, “I’ve never had a time when I was responsible for a 
mortgage personally, or for rent, or car insurance, or, for anything. So there is a way in 
which I know I am a step away from any of the kind of financial things that touch many 
families.”136 And, because most Catholic pastors rely on their congregations for their 
incomes, some pastors avoid discussing money due to the fear that their appeals will be 
interpreted as “acting on self-interest”: “Since my own livelihood is connected directly 
with how much people give, there are real tensions that are awkward. It is like I am 
raising my own salary.”137 When asked whether they received training for dealing with 
these “tensions” surrounding fundraising, the Catholic pastors in Smith and Emerson’s 
study responded with a resounding “no”: “It’s not something you do in seminary.”138  
The way in which the clergy discuss giving inevitably influences the attitude of 
lay Catholics toward their contributions to their diocese or parish. In her research on 
congregational culture and individuals’ understanding of why they give, Sharon Miller 
found that Catholics “rarely talk about their giving in other than a purely pragmatic 
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manner.”139 When describing Catholics’ reaction to her question “does giving do 
anything for you personally,” Miller mentions that she was “often met with blank stares”; 
one Catholic woman responded, “I get the sense that I am helping, but as far as making 
me go out and dance in the street, no.”140 By contrast, when Miller asked Mennonites and 
Assemblies of God members the basis for their giving, many talked about their giving in 
explicitly theological terms: “We are giving to God,” “I am being obedient to what God 
would have me do.”141 Thus, in line with the “money outlook” of the “Catholic ethic”, 
Catholics’ understanding of their giving perceptibly lacks a spiritual or theological 
dynamic.  
Nevertheless, an ecclesiastical stewardship message strongly correlates with 
higher levels of giving. According to the results of the ACGS, Catholic respondents who 
worshipped at parishes that “promoted” an ecclesiastical stewardship message 
contributed significantly more than those parishioners who belonged to parishes that did 
not promote the notion that financially supporting the Church constitutes a theological 
obligation. And, among the Catholic parishes in the ACGS, frequent, year-round 
discussions of the importance of ecclesiastical stewardship resulted in increased 
contributions. Miller’s research in the late 1990s on the relation between “people’s 
understanding of why they give” and “their self-reported giving levels” confirms the 
connection between higher levels of giving and a theological understanding of one’s 
financial contribution; as Miller explained, “Those who talk about giving out of a sense 
of responsibility or obligation to their church or denomination give at a lower level than 
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those who say that they give out of love for God [or] out of obedience to scripture.”142  
 
Zech’s Recommendations 
 Low Catholic giving is not without consequences: across the United States, 
parishes and parochial schools are continually closing due to financial limitations; 
maintenance on Church buildings is constantly put off; and the Church struggles to pay 
the retirement costs for its priests and lay employees.143 In addition, in 1994, Joseph 
Claude Harris, a research analyst who specializes in Church finances, estimated that low 
Catholic giving in the United States “costs the Church $1.963 billion a year”—a figure 
which has definitely increased due to inflation.144 Yet, despite the financial problems 
caused by low Catholic giving—which arose far before the clergy abuse crisis in 
Boston—diocesan leaders and pastors seem willing to settle for the status quo. As Smith 
and Emerson note, many pastors simply depend on the “80/20” rule in fundraising, 
namely that 80 percent of dollars raised comes from only 20 percent of donors. While 
many fundraising experts agree that the “80/20” rule is an unavoidable reality in 
fundraising, the fact that the Church in the United States faces substantial financial issues 
suggests that the contributions of the 20 percent are no longer sufficient to meet the needs 
of many Catholic dioceses and parishes. As a result, dioceses and parishes need to 
increase the giving of the 20 percent, at the very least. The above discussion of Catholic 
fundraising, however, indicates that the dioceses and parishes cannot depend on 
traditional Catholic practices related to fundraising if they hope to increase giving.  
                                                
142 Miller, “Meaning of Religious Giving,” 38.  
143 Zech, Why Catholics Don’t Give, 18.  
144 Ibid, 17.  
Salmanowitz 41 
 
In response to this situation, Zech has provided concrete recommendations for 
ways in which the Catholic Church can increase donations. Zech stresses the importance 
of financial transparency and accountability for increasing contributions: “Parishioners 
want to know where their money is going and how it’s going to be used. This is true for 
parish-level giving, and it is also true for denominational giving.”145 In Zech’s opinion, 
one way to achieve financial transparency and accountability is through granting the laity 
a greater role in decision-making processes. For instance, in terms of parish financial 
matters, Zech asserts that transparency and accountability “can only be assured when lay 
people have an input into both the development and the approval of the parish budget.” 
Regardless of how the Church actually achieves financial accountability and 
transparency, several studies since the ACGS have demonstrated that financial 
accountability and transparency is very important to most Catholics and affects their 
“decision to contribute funds to the Church.”146  
Above all, however, Zech emphasizes the importance of the ecclesiastical 
stewardship message for increasing contributions: “The one best thing the Church should 
do if it is serious about increasing giving among Catholics is to instill a sense of 
stewardship among its members.” Any time that dioceses and parishes appeal to their 
members for a specific need, they should also encourage Catholics “to be as reckless in 
[their] generosity as God has been in showering gifts upon” them. Zech adds that 
ecclesiastical stewardship “is not only a practical solution, with enormous financial 
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benefits, it is also mission-driven and theologically sound.”147 In the United States 
Conference of Bishops’ (USCCB) own material on stewardship—Stewardship: A 
Disciple’s Response, an initiative aimed at encouraging parishioners not only to 
financially support the Church but also to become more involved with the Church 
through their “time” and “talent”—the bishops reinforce Zech’s point that the 
ecclesiastical stewardship approach to increasing contributions is “theologically sound”:  
 Money and all of the things that we possess (our treasure) are gifts from God that 
we are asked to care for and generously share for our own benefit and the good of 
others…Why do we need to give? We need to give our money to individuals and 
families in need, to the Church, and to other worthwhile charitable organizations 
because giving money is good for the soul and because we need to return thanks 
to a loving God for all of the many blessings each of us has received.148 
 
While neither the bishops nor Zech provide specific, step-by-step instructions for 
implementing the ecclesiastical stewardship model into dioceses and parishes, Zech does 
make a few practical suggestions. Dioceses and parishes can further “instill a sense of 
stewardship” through a number of different tactics, such as priests “preach[ing] sermons 
on the topic of stewardship,” laypeople “giv[ing] testimonials at Mass about what their 
stewardship commitment has meant in their lives,” distributing “promotional materials,” 
and providing donors with the opportunity to fill out annual pledge cards.149 This last 
suggestion derives from the notion that “setting goals for giving” is an important aspect 
of stewardship; when people make financial pledges to the Church, they demonstrate 
their on-going commitment to returning God’s blessings. As the USSCB notes in 
Stewardship: A Disciple’s Response, “…it is important to set goals for giving. All 
Christian stewards must consider prayerfully the gifts that they have received from God, 
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and they should make a decision about what will be given.”150 The practice of pledging 
also results in larger contributions; as Zech notes, “People who plan their religious giving 
on an annual basis, rather than by looking at their checkbook each Sunday to see what 
they can afford that week, contribute more.”151   
 
Catholic Fundraising and the Archdiocese of Boston  
 Until 2002, the Archdiocese of Boston’s fundraising efforts mirrored most other 
dioceses in the country in terms of its lack of financial openness, emphasis on practical 
needs and reliance on the diocese’s wealthiest and most generous donors. Also like many 
dioceses, these fundraising practices continued in the face of significant financial 
troubles. Over the course of seven years (1994-2001), the “property-rich, cash-poor” 
Archdiocese sold $33 million in real estate, 60 percent of its stock and 98 percent of its 
bonds in order to pay for its current operations and to support disadvantaged parishes.152 
In the fiscal year that ran from July 1999 to June 2000, the Central Ministry fund had lost 
$10 million on an overall budget of $46 million, and, in the following fiscal year, it lost 
an additional $1 million.153 The Archdiocese largely recovered from these losses not by 
increasing donations but by transferring $7.3 million into its Central Ministry fund from 
other accounts, and selling a significant portion of its investment portfolio.154  
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 In the fiscal year that ran from July 2002 to June 2003, however, the Central 
Ministry fund lost $13.9 million due to the significant fall in donations following the 
clergy abuse crisis—forcing immediate and significant cuts in spending on education, 
social services and pastoral programs. Reeling from the loss of over $8 million in 
contributions to the 2002 Cardinal’s Appeal, the Archdiocese was finally forced to 
reassess the efficacy of its fundraising practices, and subsequently made several 
significant and observable changes aimed at regaining the trust of previous donors and 
eventually attracting new donors. The next chapter describes the changes the Archdiocese 
implemented in its fundraising practices after the clergy abuse crisis, including the 
specific ways in which the Archdiocese implemented Zech’s recommendations regarding 


















                                                





The Archdiocese of Boston’s New Approach to Fundraising 
 
 
In the years following the clergy abuse crisis, the Archdiocese of Boston made a 
series of critical changes at the institutional level aimed at regaining Catholic donors to 
the annual Appeal. This chapter presents these changes in the order in which they 
occurred.  
 
Evidence of Change  
A New Appeal 
In April 2003, the 400,000 parishioners in the Archdiocese of Boston’s database 
received the marketing material for the Archdiocese’s annual fundraising drive, as they 
did every year around this time. Yet, instead of a picture of Cardinal Law, the Appeal 
featured pictures of parochial school students and laypeople. And, even more significant, 
the name of the campaign had been changed from the “Cardinal’s Appeal” to the “Annual 
Catholic Appeal.” These new aspects of the annual Appeal constituted a radical change in 
tradition; for nearly two decades, Cardinal Law had served as the face of the appeal. Yet, 
in 2003, Cardinal Law was no longer the archbishop, and, following the clergy abuse 
crisis, an appeal featuring a member of the Archdiocesan leadership was not likely to 
inspire parishioners who felt deeply betrayed by the Archdiocese. With no cardinal in 
office and a clearly untenable marketing scheme, the Archdiocese needed to rebrand the 
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appeal in the hopes of “convinc[ing] parishioners that the church deserved their trust and 
financial support.”156  
A product of collaboration between the Archdiocese’s Office of Institutional 
Advancement, lay leaders, and clergy members, the new Appeal attempted to both 
acknowledge the clergy abuse scandal and emphasize the notion of “shared 
responsibility” among parishioners and the Archdiocese for the services, programs, 
agencies and ministries the Church supports in eastern Massachusetts.  The direct mail 
appeals included a prayer card and an insert describing the ways in which donations 
would be used; the insert emphasized that no donations would be allocated toward paying 
for legal fees or settlement agreements.157 And, for the first time in its history, the Appeal 
was associated with a specific theme—“One Church, Many Works”—aimed at reminding 
parishioners of the 80 programs and ministries which directly benefit from the Appeal. 
The Archdiocese hoped that the new Appeal would convey to parishioners the necessity 
of supporting the good works of the Church in times of crisis; as Damien DeVasto, the 
director of the Appeal, articulated, “The messaging was not that the crisis was behind us. 
The messaging was that we are coming together in a difficult time to underwrite Christ's 
work here in the Archdiocese of Boston.”158  
At the start of 2003, the Archdiocese had set its fundraising goal at $9 million for 
the Catholic Appeal; it ultimately exceeded its goal by $1.3 million.159 The influence of 
the rebranded campaign on this increase, however, is unclear as the new appeal coincided 
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with the announcement and arrival of the new archbishop, Bishop Seán O’Malley.  
Although the rebranding was certainly a critical step for the future of the appeal, DeVasto 
at the time attributed the success of the 2003 Catholic Appeal to O’Malley: “The 
[increase] is very clearly in response to the installation of Archbishop Seán. Many donors 
gave again in response to the wellspring of good feeling that came from his 
installation.”160 Donors were reacting not only to the installation of a leader markedly 
different from his predecessor but also to O’Malley’s handling of the clergy abuse crisis. 
As explained in Chapter 2, O’Malley followed through on his promise that settling abuse 
claims was his “top priority.” By early December, the Archdiocese and the alleged 
victims of clergy abuse had reached an $85 million settlement. And shortly thereafter, 
O’Malley announced that the Archdiocese would be funding the settlements in part 
through the sale of the Cardinal’s mansion, a “symbolic” move in the eyes of many 
Catholics who saw the sale as evidence of O’Malley’s sincere commitment to reform. 
According to Scot Landry, Secretary of Institutional Advancement from 2005 to 2010, 
several Catholics recommenced their contributions and some even “increased their 
gifts…as a sign of encouragement to Cardinal Sean for how he was leading the 
recovery.”161  
 
Engagement with Major Donors 
With this wave of enthusiasm and hope surrounding the new archbishop, the 
Archdiocese began the process of regaining the financial support of those who had given 
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major gifts prior to the crisis. When O’Malley arrived, these high net-worth individuals 
were among the most alienated donors. According to a May 2003 Globe article, the 
Archdiocese under the interim-leader Bishop Lennon did not reach out to wealthy Boston 
Catholics despite the acute need for their contributions in the aftermath of the clergy 
abuse crisis.162 While some blame this inactivity on the possibility that Bishop Lennon 
was simply “overwhelmed by his job,” others believe that his failure to reach out to 
wealthy, influential donors was likely related to the new conditions most of these 
individuals expected following the scandal.163 Considering the revelations of the 
Church’s secrecy and mismanagement, those who contributed significant amounts to the 
Church—many with backgrounds in business—now demanded more involvement with 
how the money was being allocated and how “the Church conduct[ed] its business” as a 
condition for their contribution.164  
Jack Connors was one such donor who genuinely wanted to share his expertise 
from his time at the advertising firm Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc. with the 
Archdiocese. After publicly suggesting that Catholics withhold their contributions from 
the Archdiocese and calling for Law’s resignation, Connors decided that he wanted to 
provide assistance to the Church, which appeared very much in need of his help; as 
Connors told Michael Paulson for the May 2003 Globe article: “I want to enlist people to 
rebuild our church—I just don’t think that after 2,000 years it should die on our watch. 
But I watch trends for a living, and I think it’s dying.”165 In January 2003, Connors wrote 
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to Bishop Lennon “offering help” but as of May he had not received a response.166 In 
addition, other major donors who had publicly criticized the Archdiocese, such as Paul A. 
La Camera, president and general manager of WCVB-TV, and Thomas P. O’Neill III, the 
former Massachusetts lieutenant governor, had received no call or letter from Lennon 
appealing for their contributions.167 Despite the Archdiocese’s immense need for 
financial support, Lennon’s silence implied that the Archdiocese preferred to retain its 
characteristic hierarchical and insular management practices rather than involve donors in 
the governance of the Church—a position which immensely frustrated Connors: “I’m 
upset that they don’t reach out to us—the haves—and say ‘help’…They’re so focused on 
their defense, whether it be legal or financial, that there is no offense, no dialogue, no 
outreach. One and a half years after the Globe’s first story, there is still bunker mentality, 
and I’m very critical of that because the mission is awaiting.”168  
 Today, however, Connors sits on the Archdiocese’s Finance Council—along with 
several other influential business people in Boston, including Peter Lynch of Fidelity 
Investments, John Kaneb of Hood LLC, Robert Mahoney of Belmont Savings Bank, 
Mary Ryan of Thompson Steel Company, and Laura Sen of BJ’s Whole Sale Inc. This 
turn-around in the situation demonstrates O’Malley’s decision to cooperate with wealthy 
donors who expected involvement with the management and governance of the 
Archdiocese in return for their gift. According to Landry, shortly after O’Malley’s 
arrival, “far more resources were dedicated specifically to major gifts for the annual 
appeal than before.”169 O’Malley and DeVasto dedicated a significant amount of time not 
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only to requesting large gifts but also to describing to donors “the real needs” of the 
Archdiocese, “connecting them directly with ministries so that [donors] could see the real 
impact” of their gifts and involving them in the process of how funds were allocated.170  
 
A Commitment to Financial Transparency 
Engaging stakeholders by facilitating relationships with the ministries benefitting 
from their gifts definitely constituted an important step in terms of demonstrating the 
Archdiocese’s good character. Given the tremendous loss of trust donors experienced 
after the clergy abuse scandal, the Archdiocese was forced to engage in activities that 
signaled its renewed integrity and competence. In 2004, the Archdiocese took the 
additional step of pledging its commitment to financial transparency and accountability.  
Upon his arrival in 2003, O’Malley repeatedly asserted that financial transparency 
was crucial for rebuilding trust among donors.171 In 2004 and again in 2005, O’Malley 
promised to release the audited reports for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 as well as a 
comprehensive accounting of sexual abuse funds.172 In explaining the basis for this 
significant departure from traditional Catholic practices, O’Malley cited the 
Archdiocese’s “respect for people of the Archdiocese as donors and members of our 
Church” and the intention to “demonstrate to the general public that the Archdiocese 
[was] fulfilling its fiduciary responsibilities.”173 The promised financial reports —which 
ultimately comprised more than 1,000 pages of financial data—became available in April 
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2006 online and in a special edition of The Pilot, the official newspaper of the 
Archdiocese of Boston. According to O’Malley’s aides, the financial disclosures 
constituted the most detailed disclosures ever made by a Catholic diocese.174  
Achieving financial transparency, however, involved much more than simply 
releasing audited financial statements for 2004 and 2005. Instead, a committee that 
became known as the Boston Transparency Project—consisting of CPAs, communication 
specialists, pastors and parishioners—spent close to a year developing a report that would 
not only comply with O’Malley’s promises but also would be comprehensible to the 
general public. As John McCarthy, a professor at the Kennedy School of Government 
and a member of the committee, described the process:  
The very first thing we did was to sit down…and brainstorm a list of questions. 
We asked ourselves, what are the questions that people sitting in the pews, or the 
people who are pastors, or in the media, or disenfranchised members of the 
community, or the victims of clergy sexual abuse, asking? We then put those 
questions into categories: financial and nonfinancial.175  
 
In considering the “questions” of the “people in the pews,” the committee discerned that 
the financial disclosures also constituted a “major opportunity” for the Archbishop to 
apologize for the sexual abuse crisis and its extensive consequences for the Church in 
Boston.176  
As a result, in addition to the detailed financial report—which consisted of letters 
from O’Malley and David Smith (then chancellor), a description of the organizational 
structure of the Archdiocese, a management discussion and analysis, audited financial 
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statements for 2004 and 2005, and an in-depth explanation of the costs and payments 
related to the clergy abuse crisis—the Archdiocese also published a “Questions and 
Answers” brochure. The brochure, which was placed in the pews of every parish, 
includes an apology from O’Malley and describes in “Q&A” format the financial issues 
facing the Archdiocese and how the Archdiocese intends to resolve these issues. The 
energies the transparency team devoted to this brochure and to the entire financial report 
reflects the team’s sensitivity to the precise way in which this financial information was 
communicated. McCarthy viewed the Boston Transparency Project as “largely a 
communications project.”177 Considering the events that led to the financial disclosures, it 
was critical that the Archdiocese explicitly and continually acknowledge the reasons for 
its “sobering” financial situation; as O’Malley articulated in his introductory letter to the 
brochure, “Not a day goes by that we do not seek the forgiveness and prayers of those the 
Church has disappointed or harmed.”178  
 
Private Sector Leadership 
 As alluded to above, the financial information released in 2006 revealed the dire 
state of Church finances three years after the clergy abuse crisis began. At the time of the 
financial disclosures, the Archdiocese was $46 million in debt, had closed 67 parishes, 
and had cut fifty Archdiocesan administrative positions.179 During the news conference 
for the release of the financial documents, O’Malley touched on the extent to which the 
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clergy abuse crisis continued to affect Catholic giving to the Church: “The revenue 
numbers reflect the painful experience of our recent past, the anger over the sexual abuse 
crisis and the closing of parishes.”180 And Smith’s letter in the financial report implied 
the serious need for a significant increase in revenue: “The central administration of the 
Archdiocese is not sustainable in its current form. While we do have liquidity, we have 
little left to sell, and we are faced with substantial obligations. In spite of reductions in 
force of 19 percent since the beginning of the abuse crisis, our central administration, in 
an effort to maintain services at pre-crisis levels, has operated with deficits in each 
year.”181  
 In light of these circumstances, the Archdiocese hired two lay Catholics with 
“deep roots” in the private sector, anticipating that their business and entrepreneurial 
expertise would help achieve a turn-around in the Archdiocese’s financial situation. 
James McDonough, former Chief Executive Officer of Abington Savings Bank, took on 
the role of Chancellor, who oversees finances, real estate holdings and general business 
operations.182 Scot Landry, former Chief Operating Officer at Eze Castle Software and a 
graduate of Harvard Business School, became the Chief Development Officer and 
Secretary of Institutional Advancement. McDonough and Landry also possessed a 
profound understanding of the Catholic Church on a spiritual level; prior to entering the 
business world, both men had attended seminary. The hiring of McDonough and Landry 
represented a significant investment; each received a salary of $250,000—the highest 
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paid employees at the Archdiocese by nearly $150,000. When asked by the Boston 
Business Journal about the hiring of McDonough and Landry, O’Malley stated, “We 
have great capital needs in our parishes and institutions, so the administration of the 
properties and the funds of the archdiocese are crucial for us going forward.”183 
O’Malley’s emphasis on the “administration” of Church funds implies that the 
Archdiocese needed individuals who possessed extensive expertise in organizational 
strategy and the management of resources and costs, skills acquired in the private 
sector.184  
 
Improved Management Practices 
 During his first two years as Chancellor, McDonough indeed set out to bring 
business practices to the Archdiocese’s operations. With the assistance of the well-known 
consulting firm McKinsey and Company, McDonough and an “Operational Review 
Committee”—consisting of pastors, archdiocesan employees and lay volunteers—
implemented “traditional business tools” intended to guide the Archdiocese in its 
“administrative services”; these “tools” included the development of a mission statement, 
vision statements, and “operating principles” (see footnote for the text of these 
statements).185 In addition, McDonough also oversaw the reorganization of several 
                                                
183 Kooker, “For-profit vets.”  
184 Manda Salls, “It’s Back to Business-Basics for Nonprofits,” Harvard Business School Working 
Knowledge, Februrary 23, 2004, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/3934.html (accessed April 6, 2012).  
185 James McDonough, “Chancellor’s Annual Overview,” in Archdiocese of Boston Annual Report: Fiscal 
Year Ending June 30, 2007, (Boston: April 2008), 
http://www.bostoncatholic.org/uploadedFiles/BostonCatholicorg/Offices_And_Services/Offices/rcab_finan
cial_report_fiscal_2007.pdf (accessed June 17, 2011).  
Mission Statement, Vision Statement and Operating Principles found on the Archdiocese of Boston’s 
website, under “About the Archdiocese”:  
Mission Statement: To continue the saving ministry of Jesus Christ, the Pastoral Center serves and guides 
the Catholic parishes, schools, hospitals and agencies within the 144 cities and towns of the Archdiocese of 
Salmanowitz 55 
 
offices and secretariats within the Archdiocese’s “central administration” in an effort to 
decrease costs and achieve greater efficiency.186 While McDonough asserted in his letter 
in the 2007 Annual Report that he was “not trying to run the Church as a business,” he 
nevertheless justified his reliance on for-profit practices and standards by referencing the 
acute need for organization and competence: “We must be good stewards of our precious 
resources…we must be certain that our efforts are well coordinated, that there is no 
unnecessary duplication, and that our resources are allocated so that we best achieve the 
mission of the Church in Boston.”187  
 
Willingness to Listen to Disillusioned Donors 
 McDonough’s commitment to better management practices allowed Landry to 
assure donors that their donations were being handled appropriately, a critical factor in 
Landry’s work due to the mistrust many Catholics harbored toward the Archdiocese 
following the crisis.188 In speaking to parishioners who had supported the Archdiocese 
prior to the clergy abuse scandal, Landry also found that simply listening constituted an 
effective way to regain the trust of donors and eventually re-engage them in the work of 
the Archdiocese: “You can’t overcome all of their objections. But you can listen.”189 As 
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described in previous chapters, members of the Catholic Church traditionally have not 
been given the opportunity to voice their concerns with the Church. That Landry’s office 
was willing to listen—to provide past donors with an “opportunity for venting”—
signaled a substantial change in approach.190  
 This shift in strategy reflects Landry’s dedication to communicating to 
prospective donors that the Archdiocese of Boston really cares about its parishioners, that 
it recognizes that “God willed [them] into existence, and the Archdiocese has a duty to 
them.”191 While this was certainly a difficult task in light of the clergy abuse scandal, 
Landry nevertheless emphasized again and again in an interview for this project that the 
“job of the Church isn’t to fundraise” but instead to “get people to heaven and to find 
happiness in this life.”192 Such language suggests Landry’s awareness in the aftermath of 
the crisis that the Archdiocese had to convey the sincerity of its commitment to the 
spiritual and material wellbeing of its members before it could ask for financial support. 
One such way was through the efforts of Archdiocesan officials like Landry, who 
dedicated significant energy and time to regaining the trust of donors through a 
willingness to listen to their frustrations.   
 
Implementation of Ecclesiastical Stewardship Message 
While O’Malley and DeVasto had spent time reengaging major donors such as 
Connors prior to Landry’s arrival, Landry focused on regaining the trust and 
contributions of donors at the lower giving levels.193 Consistent with his personal outlook 
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on fundraising, Landry publicly framed the importance of giving and the Catholic Appeal 
in the language of ecclesiastical stewardship—a noteworthy approach considering the 
traditional Catholic attitudes toward money and fundraising discussed in Chapter 2.  For 
instance, in his letter in the Archdiocese’s 2006 Annual Report, Landry evokes both 
Zech’s and the USCCB’s writings on the fundamental tenets of ecclesiastical stewardship 
in encouraging parishioners to support the Archdiocese:  
…our blessings and gifts ultimately come from our loving God, who trusts us to 
develop those gifts and share them for the good of his whole family. In following 
Christ’s example, we hope that more of our parishioners will see the many needs 
of the Church and come forward to share their time, talent and financial resources 
to build a stronger community of faith.194 
 
Landry employed the same language in articles in The Pilot, blog posts, and subsequent 
letters. Such an emphasis on the theological basis for giving suggests Landry did his 
homework on the basis for low Catholic giving.  
 
Outreach to Parishes 
Landry recognized, however, that an appeal articulated on behalf of the 
Archdiocese by local pastors, the individuals whom lay Catholics largely still trusted and 
wanted to help, was far more likely to resonate with parishioners than an appeal from 
Landry or another employee of the Archdiocese. Yet, many pastors resented the 
Archdiocese as much as if not more than many parishioners. Pastors were “scandalized” 
by the clergy abuse crisis, and many “freaked out” when Cardinal Law announced his 
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“zero-tolerance policy,” mentioned in the Introduction.195 According to this policy, any 
“credible allegation” of abuse would result in the removal of the priest from active 
ministry, leading innocent pastors to constantly worry about whether customary 
actions—patting a child on the shoulder, for instance—could now be construed as 
inappropriate behavior.196 As a result, Landry acknowledged that priests “had a lot of 
problems with the Archdiocese” as a result of this policy.197 Yet, given the importance of 
these priests to the success of the Catholic Appeal, Landry dedicated significant time and 
energy to trying to build relationships with disaffected priests through repeated personal 
meetings; as Landry emphasized, “You don’t earn trust with the priests in one 
meeting.”198 Much like in his meetings with parishioners, Landry sought to convey to 
pastors that the Archdiocese genuinely cared about their spiritual and material wellbeing 
and that of their congregations.  
  In an effort to “walk the talk,” Landry and the Office of Institutional 
Advancement took unprecedented steps toward providing fundraising assistance to 
parishes.199 In the years leading up to Landry’s arrival, the Archdiocese had focused on 
helping parishes manage their finances—in tandem with the Archdiocese’s own efforts to 
become more financially transparent and accountable. According to McDonough’s letter 
in the 2006 Annual Report, the Parishes and School Services division of the Archdiocese 
“diligently” assisted parishes in the “training of business managers, installing and 
instructing on the use of financial software, offering workshops for pastors, and assisting 
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the parishes in creating efficient operations.”200 Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, Catholic 
pastors have also historically struggled with effective fundraising. For most parishes 
within the Archdiocese of Boston, the offertory collection comprises fifty-five to sixty 
percent of their income; any significant decreases in revenue from the offertory collection 
could seriously jeopardize a parish’s ability to function in the way expected by 
parishioners or to even keep open its doors. 201 In addition, because parish collections are 
reported as revenue in the Archdiocese’s financial statements, the Archdiocese’s ability 
to reach a balanced budged is directly dependent on the fundraising prowess of pastors.  
 Between 2006 and 2009, Landry instituted several efforts aimed at helping 
parishes raise more money through their offertory collection, major fundraisers, and 
special collections. In his letter in the 2006 Annual Report, Landry encouraged parishes 
to provide parishioners with the option to give online through websites such as 
parishpay.com. The advantage of online giving lies in the fact that the average 
parishioner misses an average of ten to twelve Sunday Masses per year due to vacation, 
illness or other circumstances; because parishpay.com forces parishioners to set up 
monthly payments, a parish will receive parishioners’ contributions even if they are not at 
Mass on a particular Sunday. 202 According to parishpay.com, parishioners who give 
electronically tend to increase their gift size by seventy percent—in line with Zech’s 
assertion that people are more generous when they make annual or monthly pledges.203  
Moreover, beginning in September 2007, the Office of Institutional Advancement 
launched the “Fall Fundraising Forum,” which was to be held annually in the fall and 
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consisted of three seminars on different aspects of fundraising. For instance, in 2007, the 
seminars covered increasing the parish offertory, creating parish annual reports, and 
promoting planned gifts; in 2008, the seminars focused again on increasing parish 
offertory and planned gifts and added the topic of running successful capital 
campaigns.204 When asked about the basis for these seminars, Landry cited the 
Archdiocese’s dedication to providing pastors and parish business managers with the 
“tools, techniques, expertise, and advice” needed to “allow them to advance their 
missions and encourage parishioners to receive God’s blessings and return them in 
charity.”205 In 2009, Landry also launched an online blog—
ParishFundraisingBlog.com—in an effort to provide parishes with a “one-stop shop” for 
parish pastors and staff members seeking resources related to fundraising, development 
and mission advancement.206 In reflecting on these steps that his office took to provide 
fundraising assistance to parishes, Landry noted that it was something that “needed to be 
done,” not for only financial reasons but also as a way to positively impact parishioners’ 
view toward and relationship with the Archdiocese.207 In turn, the Office of Institutional 
Advancement hoped that a more positive view of the Archdiocese would translate to an 
increase in the size and number of donations to the Catholic Appeal.  
Summary  
Over the course of six years, the Archdiocese of Boston implemented substantial 
changes at the institutional level in an effort to regain donors after the 2002 clergy abuse 
crisis. These changes consisted of rebranding the annual appeal; partnering with high net-
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worth individuals; releasing financial information in a comprehensible, readable format 
on an annual basis; investing in leaders with private sector experience; adopting basic 
business practices; framing the material needs of the Church in theological or 
ecclesiastical stewardship terms; engaging with disaffected parishioners and pastors; and 
providing tangible financial management and fundraising assistance to parishes. The 
Archdiocese’s concerted effort to regain the trust of the Catholic community in Boston is 
at the root of all of these changes. In order to recover once loyal donors, the Archdiocese 
had to demonstrate that it was not only trustworthy in its handling of its finances but that 
it was also genuine in its purported desire to help the individuals who benefit from its 
ministries. As Wesley Lindahl emphasizes in Principles of Fundraising; Theory and 
Practice, “There are numerous reasons why a donor might donate to a specific charity, 
yet repeated examples shows that trust must be present to continue the donating 
relationship.”208 As the next chapter explains, through these efforts to regain the trust of 
donors, the Archdiocese also embraced many of the best practices in Catholic fundraising 
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The Effectiveness of Best Practices in Catholic and Nonprofit Fundraising 
for the Archdiocese of Boston  
 
This chapter first examines the ways in which the practices adopted by the 
Archdiocese of Boston in the aftermath of the clergy abuse crisis reflect best practices in 
Catholic fundraising as well as best practices in nonprofit fundraising more generally. 
The second half of the chapter is dedicated to assessing which of these practices were 
ultimately most effective for the development efforts of the Archdiocese.  
 
Adoption of Best Practices in Catholic Fundraising 
  The best practices in Catholic fundraising are elucidated by Zech in Why 
Catholics Don’t Give; as Frank Butler, President of Foundations and Donors Interested in 
Catholic Activities, notes in his Introduction to the second edition of Why Catholic Don’t 
Give: “Dr. Zech’s…insights on the giving practices of the faithful, offer a concise case 
for what is needed to achieving a wider and stronger participation of Catholics.”209 As  
described in the previous chapter, Zech asserts that a commitment to financial 
transparency and accountability and the implementation of an ecclesiastical stewardship 
message are critical for increasing contributions in Catholic dioceses and parishes. In the 
aftermath of the clergy abuse crisis, the Archdiocese of Boston clearly adopted these 
practices. In terms of financial transparency and accountability, the Archdiocese has 
released annual reports and independent audited statements since 2006 and has also 
invited donors to take part in “decision-making processes” regarding the management 
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and allocation of funds. The Archdiocese also espoused Zech’s recommendation 
regarding an ecclesiastical stewardship message through consistent efforts to “lift the 
discussion of money to a spiritual level,”210 such as the inclusion of a prayer card in the 
Catholic Appeal materials and Scot Landry’s insistence on using the language of 
ecclesiastical stewardship in his communications with the public as Secretary of 
Institutional Advancement.  
 
Adoption of Best Practices in Nonprofit Fundraising 
In the aftermath of the clergy abuse crisis, the Archdiocese was forced to compete 
with other organizations and causes for donors. Parishioners who experienced a 
tremendous loss of trust in the Archdiocese but who still wanted to support Catholic 
causes or Boston’s neediest individuals and services could easily turn to other 
organizations, such as Catholic Charities (which dissociated itself from the Archdiocese 
after the scandal), or United Way. As Zech noted in a phone conversation, “If you feel 
like the diocese is letting you down, you will give to other causes even if you have the 
stewardship mentality.”211 Thus, in an effort to regain and attract new donors, the 
Archdiocese went beyond Catholic fundraising best practices and appropriated many of 
the best practices in nonprofit fundraising.  
Major Donors 
Under O’Malley, the Archdiocese’s commitment to engaging with major donors 
was a crucial action. As Wesley Lindhal notes in Principles of Fundraising, “Major gift 
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donors are in many ways the most important donors to any nonprofit organization.”212 
The importance of major donors largely derives from the 80/20 rule in fundraising; as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the 80/20 rules holds that 80 percent of contributions 
will come from only 20 percent of donors. Yet, many experts now consider the 80/20 rule 
obsolete; instead, starting in the late 1990s, many campaigns received 90 to 95 percent of 
their gifts from just 5 to 10 percent of donors.213 This new standard in fundraising, let 
alone the traditional 80/20 rule, indicates the critical nature of high net-worth donors and 
major gifts to an organization.  
In approaching major donors after the clergy abuse crisis, the Archdiocese 
adopted current best practices in working with these donors, such as increased 
stewardship and the commitment to truly partnering with donors. As noted earlier, 
following the scandal, the Archdiocese dedicated far more energy and resources than ever 
before to its work with major donors. One result of this renewed focus on major donors 
was that that the Office of Institutional Advancement worked towards facilitating 
relationships between donors and the ministries their gifts supported. Such efforts reflect 
the Archdiocese’s commitment to proper stewardship, which in this context refers to the 
“process whereby an organization seeks to be worthy of continued philanthropic 
support.”214 By encouraging and allowing donors to observe first hand the benefits of 
their gift, an organization not only “strengthens donors ties to the nonprofit” but also 
“encourages future gifts from the benefactor.”215  
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 The Archdiocese also took the unprecedented step of collaborating with major 
donors by inviting these individuals to assist in the Archdiocese’s handling of its 
finances. While such a partnership was certainly a condition of many donors’ gifts in 
light of the clergy abuse scandal, it is also in line with the expectations of today’s 
philanthropists more generally. A 2006 study conducted by the Center on Philanthropy 
found that the “most philanthropic people in America are entrepreneurs,” most of whom 
are not content with the more traditional  “give, name, and go away style of 
philanthropy.” Instead, today’s major donors demand more involvement in the cause they 
financially support; as Greg Dees, professor of Social Entrepreneurship and Nonprofit 
Management at Duke University, is quoted as saying in the book Philanthrocapitalism: 
“Philanthropy today is best defined more broadly than giving money away, as mobilizing 
and deploying private resources, including money, time, social capital and expertise to 
improve the world in which we live.”216 An organization looking to attract and retain 
major donors will therefore make every effort to partner with these individuals who want 
to use all of their assets—not simply their monetary wealth—to help a particular 
organization or a cause.  
 
Accountability 
Nevertheless, these major donors—and donors at all giving levels—expect the 
highest standards of accountability in return for their gifts. According to those who 
closely watch and study the nonprofit sector, a direct correlation exists between 
accountability and successful fundraising. As Eugene Tempel, one of the editors of 
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Achieving Excellence in Fundraising emphasizes, “The organization that…holds itself 
accountable to its constituents…can engage in fundraising from a position of strength.”217 
In the last two decades, accountability has become absolutely essential for nonprofits 
looking to maintain and attract donors.  
Until the 1980s, charities sought to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of 
their work to donors by reporting the “number assisted.”218 Yet, as Ken Berger and 
Robert Penna of Charity Navigator, an organization that evaluates the accountability and 
transparency of the largest charities in the United States, point out, such emphasis on 
“counting activities” usually failed to address whether the efforts of the charity had 
actually made “any meaningful, sustainable, or measureable positive change to those they 
existed to serve.”219 Berger and Penna argue that the failure of charities to provide 
“meaningful” data regarding the effectiveness of their work derived from the reporting 
techniques of older charities and the government:  
From these sources the charities of the latter third of the 20th Century were 
bequeathed a belief that the simple act of making services available was virtually 
the same as solving a problem, a concept that worked to the particular benefit of 
state and federal legislators anxious to show their constituents that, via the 
appropriations they approved, they were doing something about various social 
problems.220  
 
In the early 1990s, however, non-profit organizations and charities began to experience 
increased pressure to provide evidence that their services were actually necessary and 
effective in the lives of their clients. This push for increased accountability within the 
nonprofit sector, commonly referred to as the “outcomes movement,” was largely 
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prompted by the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act, an initiative aimed at 
ensuring that public money for federal projects was being used appropriately.221  
 In more recent years, donors have started to expect not only “meaningful… 
evidence of results” but also financial and managerial transparency due to the scandals 
that emerged between 2000 and 2002 such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco.222 While 
these instances of financial mismanagement and fraud occurred at for-profit corporations, 
Berger and Panna note that the scandals produced a “ripple effect” in the nonprofit sector: 
“Organizations of all kinds came under new scrutiny regarding their management, 
spending decisions, and ethical behavior.” 223 Consequently, donors also have come to 
expect full accounts of organizations’ “effectiveness, management and expenditure 
decisions.”224 As the opening line of a 2003 New York Times article on the topic of “new 
ideas for making finances clearer and scandals rarer” stated, “Everywhere you turn in the 
world of philanthropy and nonprofits these days, people are talking about 
accountability.”225  
As a result of this demand for transparency and accountability, a great deal of 
literature has come out of universities and consulting firms in the last decade regarding 
the ways in which non-profits can—and must—adapt to this new demand for 
accountability. Much of this work centers on the way in which nonprofits can improve 
their management and operational practices in order to achieve greater accountability. As 
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Tempel asserts, “More sophisticated donors and funders today are holding organizations 
to higher standards of accountability. Doing so demands professional management 
approaches that lead to organizational readiness for fundraising.”226  
 A December 2008 piece in Harvard Business Review provides a comprehensive 
example of the existing literature on achieving accountability through improved 
management practices. The essay, “Delivering on the Promise of Nonprofits,” argues that 
responsible management practices will help nonprofits actually “deliver results,” or the 
outcomes expected by “their staff members, their boards, and public and private 
donors.”227 Written by Jeffrey Bradach, Thomas J. Tierney, and Nan Stone—all of The 
Bridgespan Group, a nonprofit consulting firm that provides “strategic consulting and 
executive search services to non-profits and philanthropies”—the essay represents the 
written version of the message Bradach and his colleagues had been disseminating to 
nonprofits by means of seminars and lectures since 2004.228 
First and foremost, the authors encourage nonprofits to step back and “confront” 
four critical questions: “Which results will we hold ourselves accountable for? How will 
we achieve them? What will results really cost, and how can we fund them? How do we 
build the organization to deliver the results?”229 The authors then emphasize that 
nonprofits must (1) achieve “financial clarity”, (2) be able to “very clearly articulate what 
the organization needs financial support for, and identify appropriate sources” of funding,  
(3) develop better management processes, and (4) “build leadership capacity” by 
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investing in “topflight executive performance.”230 These recommendations not only 
provide nonprofits with practices that indicate accountability but they also address the 
challenges the nonprofit sector has typically faced in “delivering results.”231  
The four questions listed above that the Bridgespan consultants insist 
organizations consider stem from traditional struggles with developing an achievable 
mission and goals. The questions—which ideally force nonprofit leaders to assess the 
current effectiveness of the organization’s ambitions, structures and processes—are 
meant to ultimately provide nonprofits with a “framework” for creating “pragmatic, 
specific plans for making a tangible difference.”232 In relation to the authors’ specific 
recommendations, the first two —accomplishing “financial clarity” and expressing the 
basis for financial needs—certainly convey the necessity of financial transparency and 
accountability following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.233 Nevertheless, these 
recommendations additionally reflect the fact that “nonprofits’ financial systems typically 
are rudimentary,” resulting in decision-makers’ murky understanding of the 
organization’s financial situation and the true costs and needs of programs.234 The third 
recommendation—developing better management processes—acknowledges the 
disorganization and inefficiency that characterize many nonprofits: “[Nonprofits] are 
often marked by persistent confusion about roles and responsibilities and by opaque 
decision making…The costs show up both in a weakened ability to achieve results for 
beneficiaries and in burnout among volunteers and staff members.”235   
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The recommendation that nonprofits should invest in competent and 
knowledgeable leaders is, on the one hand, common sense; as the authors state, “B-level 
leadership teams will not deliver A-level results.”236 Yet, this recommendation also 
derives from an issue in the nonprofit sector referred to as “the leadership deficit” by the 
Bridgespan Group.237 In 2006, Thomas Tierney authored a report on the “dearth of strong 
leaders” in nonprofit organizations: “Many nonprofit organizations struggle to attract and 
retain the talented senior executives they need to convert dollars into social impact. 
Searches for chief executives, operating and financial officers often turn up only one to 
three qualified candidates, compared with four to six comparable private-sector 
positions.”238 Tierney’s main concern in the report, however, is the fact that as the sector 
grows and baby boomer executives retire, nonprofits will need to hire 640,000 new 
executives; in other words, unless change occurs in the hiring process, the leadership 
deficit will only worsen in the next decade.  
Tierney therefore asserts the necessity of increased spending on “leadership,” 
which comprises “recruiting expenses, training costs, salaries and benefits.”239 In 
response to traditional “resistance” to overhead costs in the nonprofit sector, Tierney 
argues that “leadership development-related expenditures…cannot be lumped” with 
overhead costs.240 On the topic of salaries, Tierney maintains that although “talented 
managers don’t join nonprofits to get rich,” competitive compensation is still important: 
“The short list of candidates attracted to a chief operating offering job paying $90,000 
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looks dramatically different from the one for the same position advertised at $70,000. 
The additional $20,000 attracts candidates who not only are more seasoned, but who also 
have more experience running more complex organizations.”241  
In considering the Bridgespan Group’s recommendations for achieving greater 
accountability in relation to the practices of the Archdiocese of Boston following the 
clergy abuse crisis, it becomes clear that the Archdiocese had adopted all of these 
practices by 2008. In the years following the clergy abuse scandal, the Archdiocese 
carefully developed a mission statement and a plan to achieve this mission; evaluated its 
operational system and subsequently restructured offices and processes; released 
thousands of pages of financial documents and committed to disclosing such information 
on an annual basis; and invested in competent leaders with backgrounds in the private 
sector. This observable commitment to accountability signals the Archdiocese’s 
recognition that achieving accountability was one of the most important steps it could 
take in regaining the trust of donors.  
 
Effectiveness of Best Practices  
 
 The question remains whether the adoption of these best practices in Catholic and 
nonprofit fundraising actually resulted in the recovery of the annual Appeal since the 
clergy abuse crisis. The short answer is yes. Within six years of the crisis, the revenue 
from the annual Appeal nearly returned to pre-2002 levels, reaching approximately $15 
million in 2008. In the years immediately following the crisis, the revenue raised by the 
Appeal began to increase steadily, garnering $10.3 million in 2003, $10.9 million in 
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2004, $11.8 million in 2005, $13.6 million in 2006 and $14 million in 2007.242 Yet, while 
the Catholic Appeal may have recovered in terms of revenue, the number of donors to the 
appeal has definitely not returned to pre-crisis levels. In 2009, 48,937 Catholics donated 
to the Catholic Appeal, relative to 84,624 in 2001.243 This section first examines the 
relationship between the increase in revenue and the changes made by the Archdiocese, 
and then discusses the implications of the fact that the number of donors to the Appeal 
has not yet recovered. 
 
Increased Revenue 
The Rebranded Appeal 
 The rebranding of the Cardinal’s Appeal is one change that certainly contributed 
to the recovery of the annual fundraising drive. While the monetary increase in 2003 was 
due in large part to the arrival of O’Malley, the success of the Appeal continued in the 
following years. Although the Office of Institutional Advancement was initially 
concerned that the closing of parishes in 2004 (referred to by the Archdiocese as 
“reconfiguration”) would affect the Catholic Appeal, the 2004 Appeal garnered $11 
million—up from $10.3 million in 2003 and $8.8 million in 2002. Between 2002 and 
2004, the Appeal experienced an increase of over 20 percent in funds raised and over 30 
percent in donor participation.244 DeVasto cited the Appeal themes, which change every 
year, as a likely reason for the increase in revenue and number of donors.245 For instance, 
in 2004, the theme—“Together in Faith”—sought to both acknowledge the closing of 
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parishes and remind Catholics of the larger Catholic community in Boston; as DeVasto 
noted, this theme “spoke implicitly to our sense of shared mission and to the recognition 
that reconfiguration was an issue confronting all parishioners.”246 More generally, the 
focus in the Appeal materials on the programs and individuals who benefit from the 
Catholic Appeal—Catholic School students, families, elderly or disabled parishioners, 
social services for the poor and the sick, disadvantaged parishes—appears to have 
resonated with the thousands of Catholics who recommenced their contributions or gave 
to the Archdiocese for the first time; as O’Malley noted in a Boston Globe article about 
the appeal: “I think that people realize the wonderful work that’s being done…The needs 
are there.”247  
 
Financial Transparency and Better Management Practices  
 It also appears that O’Malley’s commitment to financial transparency and 
concerted efforts to “modernize and professionalize the church administration” helped 
regain donors.248 In response to the fact that the Archdiocese raised $13.8 in 2006, 
Thomas Groome, director of the Institute of Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry at 
Boston College, argued that the increased revenue signaled the laity’s approval of 
O’Malley and his work: “It’s one of the ways the Catholic laity have of voting, with their 
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pocketbooks, and they’re obviously beginning to vote for [O’Malley].”249 DeVasto also 
believes that there was a strong correlation between the changes made within the 
Archdiocese and the increase in contributions to the Appeal in the years following the 
crisis: “Clearly…there is a strong demonstration of forward movement and a recognition 
by Catholics of the progress that’s taking place across the Archdiocese. There’s more to 
be done—there’s no question—but this is a real reflection that there is a greater sense of 
community and progress.”250   
 
Engaging and Partnering with Major Donors  
 Although the rebranded appeal and O’Malley’s focus on greater transparency and 
accountability contributed to the recovery of the revenue raised by the Appeal, 
Archdiocesan officials, such as Landry and DeVasto, note the significant role of the 
growth of the “Cardinal’s Leadership Circle,” or those donors who gave gifts of $10,000 
or more. That high net-worth donors were fundamental to regaining pre-crisis revenue 
levels is not surprising given the “80/20” or, more recently the “90/10”, rule in 
fundraising. Nevertheless, the extent to which the Leadership Circle grew from 2002 to 
2009 is quite noteworthy. In 2001, the year before the clergy abuse scandal, 78 
individuals contributed at the $10,000 level, and their gifts made up approximately eight 
percent of the total raised. In 2002, the number of those in the Leadership Circle dropped 
to 36.251 Yet, by 2009, the Leadership Circle had not only regained the pre-crisis number 
of donors but had grown to 106 individuals, with their gifts now comprising 
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approximately 38 percent of the total raised by the Appeal.252  
In a personal email exchange, DeVasto indicated that the growth of the 
Leadership Circle is a direct result of the time that he and O’Malley dedicated and 
continue to dedicate to engaging and “truly partnering” with these donors: “To move 
forward as an Archdiocese we recognized the need to engage leadership [donors] in a 
very personal, direct way. From that experience, and as a reflection of the belief these 
leaders have in the direction of the Archdiocese, many provided significant support.”253 
The Archdiocese now considers this collaborative relationship with major donors to be 
fundamental to its mission and operating principles; as DeVasto noted, O’Malley 
“embraces” the collaborative model of governance and the institution is continually 
striving to “reflect” such a model.254   
  
Low Number of Donors 
While the revenue of the Catholic Appeal nearly returned to pre-crisis levels by 
2008—due in large part to the growth of the Leadership Circle—the number of donors to 
the annual appeal has definitely not recovered. Between 2002 and 2004, the Archdiocese 
gained about 14,000 donors to the Catholic Appeal, an increase tied most with the 
rebranding of the appeal, the installation of O’Malley, and the growth of the Leadership 
Circle. 255 In 2005, however, the number of donors fell from 53,853 to 49,698, an 
indication of the discontent felt by many Catholics in the wake of parish closings deemed 
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necessary by O’Malley in January 2005.256 The number of donors has since hovered 
between 48,000 and 49,000, relative to 84,624 in 2001.257  
The Archdiocese’s inability to regain more donors in the aftermath of the clergy 
abuse crisis is likely a result of several factors.  First and foremost, parishioners are still 
angry with, disillusioned by and mistrustful of the Archdiocese. As Scot Landry 
acknowledged, “It’s going to take another generation to get these people back [and] to 
trust the Archdiocese…beyond [one’s] parents, Catholics should be able to trust a priest 
because he is a man of God. You can’t fix this type of betrayal easily.”258 Many pastors 
are also still wary of the Archdiocese—and, as a result, they presumably do not dedicate 
a significant amount of time to encouraging their parishioners to financially support the 
Archdiocese.  In addition, Landry also noted that a fair amount of donors not only 
discontinued their donations to the Archdiocese’s Appeal but also left the Church 
altogether in the aftermath of the clergy abuse crisis.259  
The difficulty the Archdiocese has experienced in regaining donors inevitably 
brings into question the effectiveness of the ecclesiastical stewardship message Zech so 
encouraged and the Archdiocese embraced after the crisis. While the rebranded appeal 
featured religious themes in the years immediately following the crisis—namely, “One 
Church, Many Works,” “Together in Faith,” “Our Faith at Work”—they did not so much 
frame giving as a theological obligation as remind parishioners of the many ministries 
supported by the Archdiocese and the real needs of these programs and services. And, the 
members of the Cardinal’s Leadership Circle did not give substantial amounts because 
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they suddenly understood their gifts as material representations of their recognition that 
“all their gifts and blessings ultimately come from God.” Instead, the Archdiocese 
attracted leadership donors by asking for their involvement in the operational 
management of the Archdiocese and by demonstrating its commitment to adopting the 
best practices in nonprofit fundraising.   
Rather than providing evidence of the success of ecclesiastical stewardship, the 
case of the Archdiocese of Boston demonstrates the difficultly of implementing a top-
down ecclesiastical stewardship message in a diocese the size of Boston—which is 
perhaps why Zech focuses largely on implementing stewardship at the parish level in 
Why Catholics Don’t Give and What Can Be Done it. For ecclesiastical stewardship to be 
successful on the diocesan level, the diocese must have the support of pastors in the 
diocese. That less than three percent of the Catholic population in the geographic area 
covered by the Archdiocese of Boston currently contributes to the Catholic Appeal 
suggests that the Archdiocese simply does not have the support it needs at the parish level 
for the ecclesiastical stewardship model to be effective. 
 During a phone conversation, Zech acknowledged some potential reasons for the 
reluctance of pastors to implement this theologically-based approach. First, ecclesiastical 
stewardship programs do not have an immediate effect on giving; pastors are often 
unwilling to commit to a program that does not produce relatively quick results.  “A 
consumer mentality exists…[but] the benefits of stewardship don’t become apparent 
overnight.”260 Second, many pastors may not have viewed the ecclesiastical stewardship 
approach as a priority for their parishes; Zech explained that as “the pope of the parish,” a 
pastor will sometimes disregard the priorities of the denominational leadership if his 
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parish does not share those priorities: “the priest will do what he feels is most important 
for his parish.”261 For instance, a pastor who feels that he will receive a sufficient amount 
of contributions by relying on a summary of the parish’s material needs might not 
embrace the ecclesiastical stewardship message. If the pastor does not use an 
ecclesiastical stewardship message to encourage his parishioners to give to their own 
parish, parishioners are very unlikely to view giving to the diocese as a theological 
obligation. 
Thus, the Archdiocese of Boston has largely failed to instill in its members the 
notion that giving represents a theological duty, a way of expressing one’s gratitude to 
God. While individual parishes in Boston may be able to successfully use the 
ecclesiastical stewardship approach to increase donations, such an approach has proved 
far more difficult to implement at the diocesan level. It is certainly “theologically sound” 
for the Archdiocese to continue to frame giving in the language of ecclesiastical 
stewardship in annual report letters and marketing materials; but, in terms of maintaining 
current donors and attracting new donors, the Archdiocese needs to focus most on 
continuing and improving the strategies which have proved most successful since 2003—
namely, a commitment to financial transparency, the adoption of the best practices in the 





                                                




The Archdiocese of Boston’s Fundraising Future 
To date, the Archdiocese has been able to regain most of the revenue that it lost in 
2002 with roughly only fifty-five percent of the donors it had prior to the crisis. 
Nevertheless, according to DeVasto, the Office of Institutional Advancement is “trying to 
go for as wide a pool of donors as possible.”262 This is both a smart fundraising strategy 
for the Archdiocese of Boston after the clergy abuse crisis and in line with the 
fundamental character of Catholicism. If the Archdiocese relies only on rebuilding trust 
and relationships with major donors, it will perpetuate the impression among the majority 
of parishioners that the Archdiocese is not actually concerned about their well-being or 
their faith—an impression that clearly will not result in contributions from this wider 
base.  
In addition, the idea that everyone matters embodies the original meaning of 
Catholicism. From the Greek words kath holou, the term “catholic” means “of the whole” 
or “universal.”263 The early Church became known as the Catholic Church as a way to 
refer to the “unity of all the local churches in union with each other.”264 While the term 
“Catholic” now distinguishes the Catholic Church from the Orthodox and Protestant 
churches, an emphasis on collectivity and community has endured in the Catholic faith. 
As Lawrence Cunningham, Professor of Moral Theology at Notre Dame, explains in An 
Introduction to Catholicism, “Catholic morality insists that all human beings are, by 
nature, relational—borrowing from the Old Testament insight that the two fundamental 
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laws of our relation to God involve love of God and love of neighbor.”265 As part of the 
Catholic Church, the Archdiocese of Boston and, more specifically, its development 
efforts should embody such an emphasis on community. Francis Butler, president of 
Foundations and Donors Interested in Catholic Activities (FADICA) articulated the 
importance of reaching out to all potential Catholic donors in his keynote address at the 
2006 National Leadership Roundtable on Church Management (NLRCM) at the Wharton 
School of Business: “…when everyone counts…the Church is better able to fulfill its 
mission of giving witness to the reality of Christ’s presence among His people.”266 
The Archdiocese’s most recent development-related actions suggest that it is 
indeed striving to capitalize on its past successes in fundraising in order to increase the 
number of donors to the Catholic Appeal. In October 2010, the Archdiocese announced 
the creation of a coordinated development clearinghouse: “In order to strengthen and 
enhance the resources needed to fulfill the mission we received from Jesus Christ and His 
Church, the Archdiocese is establishing a more effective, coordinated and strategic 
development approach. The new entity, Boston Catholic Development Services (BCDS) 
will streamline the fundraising strategies of the Archdiocese.”267 The BCDS was created 
in an effort to address the difficulty many parishioners experience in discerning between 
various Church-related appeals for money; in addition to the Archdiocese’s annual 
Catholic Appeal, parishioners are being asked to support several other Archdiocesan 
related funds, including the Clergy Fund and the Campaign for Catholic Schools. By 
placing all three funds within the jurisdiction of the same development office, the 
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Archdiocese hopes to not only alleviate parishioner confusion but also to better 
coordinate the timing of appeals so as materials for the Catholic Appeal, for example, are 
not mailed the same week as materials for the Campaign for Catholic Schools.   
In November 2010, O’Malley announced the appointment of Kathleen Driscoll as 
the new Secretary for Institutional Advancement, 268 whose responsibilities include the 
implementation of the BCDS vision—an undertaking that is still in progress. The 
appointment of Driscoll signals O’Malley’s continued commitment to hiring “top talent”; 
prior to this appointment, Driscoll served as the President of the Catholic School 
Campaign and held leadership roles at John Hancock Financial Services and Hill, 
Holliday, Connors and Cosmopulos, Inc.269  
 While Driscoll and her colleagues work on reorganizing the Archdiocese’s 
development efforts, those involved with the Catholic Appeal are trying yet another 
marketing strategy for the 2012 Appeal. Whereas the initial rebranded Appeal broadly 
emphasized the needs of the Catholic community—for instance, parochial school 
children in Boston need financial support—the 2012 marketing material consists of three 
stories about specific individuals who have directly benefited from the work of the 
Archdiocese. There is Kate, who was a “young mother…with a new baby on the way, an 
uncertain financial future, and great strains on her marriage.” After seeking the help of 
the Archdiocese’s Pro-Life Ministry, Kate received the opportunity to “be heard” and to 
“receive compassionate, practical advice.” Then there is Georgia, an elderly member of 
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Saint Agatha Parish in Milton who is now confined to a wheelchair. With the help of the 
Archdiocese’s Office for Persons with Disabilities, Saint Agatha Parish “developed a 
plan that improved sacramental access for all parishioners and ensured better 
accommodations for persons with disabilities and their families.” Finally, there is Steven, 
a college student who “faced many challenges to his faith” when he first arrived on 
campus. Through the Archdiocese’s College Campus Ministry, Steven was able to 
receive help in “practic[ing]” his “Catholic faith while away from home.”270 The appeal 
brochure includes full-page pictures of Kate and her baby Elle, Georgia and Steven.  
 The story of the Good Samaritan serves as the overarching theme of the 2012 
Catholic Appeal. The first page of the appeal states in large letters, “Someone needs 
you,” and the last page encourages parishioners to become a “good Samaritan”: “We all 
need a Good Samaritan. The Good Samaritan is You.”271 As Courtney Wahle, a 
development marketing manager at the Archdiocese, noted, the “very visual” nature of 
the Appeal and the personal stories are intended to spark an “emotional connection” 
among parishioners.272 An appeal to emotion is a common and often successful strategy 
used by non-profit organizations to garner donations.273 In their essay on “Developing 
and Articulating a Case for Support” in Achieving Excellence in Fundraising, Timothy 
Seiler and Eva Aldrich note that the use of emotion is a sound fundraising strategy, and 
encourage organizations to do precisely what the Archdiocese has done in the 2012 
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Catholic Appeal, namely include “testimonials and photos of clients of your 
organization” in direct mail pieces in an effort to demonstrate the “ways the world will be 
better as a result of your organization’s work.”274 The Archdiocese of Boston hopes that 
this new branding—which emphasizes the scope of the Archdiocese’s services and 
therefore might resonate with a diverse group—will increase the number of donors to this 
year’s Catholic Appeal.  
Going Forward  
 While the reorganization of the Archdiocese’s development efforts and the newest 
marketing strategy for the Cardinal’s Appeal are certainly smart actions in terms of 
continuing to maintain past donors and regain new donors, it is unlikely that these steps 
will result in the return of the roughly 36,000 donors who once gave to the Archdiocese’s 
annual Appeal but no longer do. Again, as Landry realistically surmised, “it’s going to 
take another generation” for the number of donors to reach pre-crisis levels.275 Thus, 
going forward, the Archdiocese must focus on engaging the youngest generations of 
Catholics in order to build donor participation levels. 
According to Wahle, who is 28, many Catholics her age have distanced 
themselves from the Church, especially after the clergy abuse scandal. As these 
individuals are beginning to get married, however, they are also beginning to think that 
they may want to bring up their children in the same they were brought up; as Wahle 
noted, “the importance of religion is coming back into their lives.”276 These Catholics and 
their future children represent a unique opportunity for the Archdiocese of Boston. 
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Young Catholic couples have certainly not forgotten the clergy abuse scandal but they are 
willing to return to the Church because they want their children to experience an 
upbringing similar to their own; and their children will have no memory of the scandal.  
In fundraising parlance, these families constitute “likely donors” as they have 
already indicated an interest in the Church and its works.277 Yet, as Seiler emphasizes in 
his essay on establishing a constituency base in Achieving Excellence in Fundraising, 
likely donors must be “sought out and invited to become part of the philanthropic base 
that will augment and celebrate the organization’s work.”278 If the interests of these 
potential donors are neglected, however, they will “drift away” from the status of likely 
donor.279 Archdiocesan fundraisers must therefore build strong relationships with these 
young Catholic families. The parents have demonstrated their willingness to move past 
the clergy abuse crisis, and the children are poised to experience a Church not beset with 
scandal and financial trouble.  
Paul Schervish’s research as Director of Boston College’s Center on Wealth and 
Philanthropy suggests that a focus on the younger generations of Catholics is not simply 
an opportunity but a necessity. In the late 1990s, Schervish and his colleague John 
Havens began a microsimulation project “designed to estimate the potential for growth in 
personal wealth.”280 Until Schervish and Haven’s project, the figure for the “forthcoming 
transfer of wealth” from “the aging wealthy” to their children had been “universally 
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cited” as around $10 trillion.281 According to Schervish and Haven’s microsimulation 
model, the figure for the transfer of wealth will actually be “many times higher” than $10 
trillion: “Our low-range estimate is that over the fifty-five year period from 1998 to 2052, 
the wealth transfer will be $41 trillion and may well reach double that amount.”282 
 In relation to how this astounding figure will affect philanthropy, Schervish 
argues that “even the lowest estimate of growth in wealth should serve to indicate the 
potential for substantial and even increasing levels of charitable giving, especially among 
those at the upper ends of wealth and income.”283 As a result, nonprofit organizations 
must figure out how best to engage their younger constituents who will ultimately be 
inheriting this wealth over the next forty years. At the 2006 National Leadership 
Rountable on Church Management, Michael Hoffman, CEO and chairman of Changing 
Our World, Inc—a consulting firm dedicated specifically to fundraising and 
philanthropy—emphasized the importance of the younger generation for Catholic 
fundraising specifically:  
The challenge for all of us is there’s a tremendous number of young Catholics 
who are either wealthy or going to be wealthy.  They may be totally focused now 
on their jobs and their families, and may not even go to Church. Nonetheless, we 
have to make a conscience effort to find them and get them to become active in 
the Church, to join our boards and our committees, for example. We then have to 
educate them about the gift of philanthropy.284 
 
Hoffman’s point reinforces the serious implications of Schervish’s research on the 
upcoming wealth transfer for the fundraising efforts of the Archdiocese of Boston. Young 
Catholics not only are the most likely to be willing to move past the clergy abuse scandal 
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but they also are or will become the city’s wealth-holders. As Hoffman implies, finding 
and engaging these younger Catholics is critical to the success of the Catholic Appeal in 
the years to come—both in terms of revenue and number of donors.  
 During his nine years as archbishop in Boston, O’Malley has signaled that he 
recognizes the importance of reaching young Catholics. In an effort to curb the pattern of 
young Catholics “drifting away” from their faith as they enter high school and college, 
O’Malley commissioned the “Faith Formation Committee” in 2006. This committee 
assessed the best ways to “keep the faith alive in the hearts of young men and women, 
through their high school and college years, and beyond.”285 After spending almost two 
years researching and examining “best principles and practices” for “effectively serving” 
youth and young adults, the committee devised a series of recommendations for 
improving the Church’s relationship with young Catholics. These recommendations 
included: O’Malley himself engaging with both the youth and young adults of the 
Archdiocese of Boston and those who serve these young Catholics; the establishment of 
“effective and regular communication among all who minister to young people”; and the 
use of “modern means of communication to engage youth and young adults.”286  
 In response to these recommendations, O’Malley launched the Office for New 
Evangelization of Youth and Young Adults (ONE) in January 2008. The name of the 
office derives from Pope John Paul II’s call for “new evangelization” during his 
pontificate, which drew from Pope Paul VI’s use of the term when addressing the 
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“challenges facing the mission of the Church” in the 1960s and 1970s.287  ONE 
encompasses a number of ministries—such as the Young Adult Ministry and the Family 
and Intergenerational Ministry—and “intentionally plans, collaborates and coordinates” 
with a number of relevant Archdiocesan offices, including the Catholic Schools Office 
and the Office for Religious Education.288  
  While faith formation among youth and young adults is critical to the viability of 
the Catholic Church in Boston, the Archdiocese must simultaneously focus on how to 
also instill in these Catholics the importance of giving back to the Church. As the 
ecclesiastical stewardship message does not seem to be a particularly effective strategy in 
the short term, the Archdiocese needs to find a way to regularly convey both the 
significance of its work and the merits of philanthropy to its constituents. For instance, 
the Archdiocese should consider better incorporating lessons on its work and on giving 
back to the Church into the curriculum of its schools and its religious education 
programs.  
 
Ten Years Later, Financial Questions Remain  
Although the revenue from the Catholic Appeal has nearly returned to pre-crisis 
levels and the Archdiocese achieved a balanced budget in 2010, the Archdiocese still 
faces financial challenges. After rebounding to $15 million in 2008, the revenue from the 
Catholic Appeal has dropped slightly in recent years—garnering $14 million in 2010 and 
                                                
287 Office for New Evangelization of Youth and Young Adults, “History of ONE,” 
http://www.one4boston.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/History-of-ONE.pdf (accessed April 15, 2012).  
288 “History of ONE.”  
Salmanowitz 88 
 
$12.5 million in 2011. 289 Although there does not seem to be a clear reason for the 
decline, this decrease is presumably due in large part to the economic downturn, which 
has affected the fundraising campaigns of nonprofit organizations across the country.  
In addition, it remains unclear how two major plans announced by the 
Archdiocese in the last two years will affect the Archdiocese’s finances and development 
efforts. The first is the Archdiocese’s “new finance model,” whereby all parishes will 
eventually be “expected to contribute 18 percent of their weekly offertory, ‘grand annual’ 
fundraising drive, and net rental income” to the Archdiocese’s Central Ministry.290 Ten 
percent of that amount will be in the form of a parish tithe and eight percent will 
constitute a Catholic Appeal assessment. According to the Archdiocese, this assessment 
model is intended to eliminate confusion and inequity, which apparently characterized the 
old system of fees most parishes were required to annually pay the Archdiocese. As an 
incentive for parishes to improve their fundraising efforts, the Archdiocese has promised 
that parishes that exceed their “Catholic Appeal goals” will receive back 50 percent of 
that excess.291 According to Stephen Barrett, co-chair of the Archdiocese’s Improved 
Financial Relationship Committee, the new model is intended to benefit both the 
Archdiocese and parishes as it encourage parishes to develop better fundraising practices: 
“You’ll have a reward system that incentivizes fundraising and stewardship 
initiatives.”292 To date, only 33 parishes have participated in the pilot program for the 
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new finance model; nevertheless, the results are “heartening” for the Archdiocese as 
these parishes on average experienced a 17 percent increase in contributions in the last 
year.293 While it remains to be seen how successful the model will be once all parishes in 
the diocese are participating, these results suggest that such a model might be an effective 
way of convincing parishes to finally commit to adopting the ecclesiastical stewardship 
approach Zech and the USCCB bishops so vehemently advocate.   
Faced with numerous challenges at the parish level—most significantly, a 
shortage of priests and lay people willing to serve professionally in parishes—the 
Archdiocese has also proposed a major reorganization effort. Known as the “Pastoral 
Plan,” the Archdiocese has announced its intention to eventually group local parishes 
together in large clusters; each cluster will be overseen by a “parish team,” which 
consists of priests, deacons, pastoral associates, and advisory councils.294 Each team will 
have responsibility for determining “‘how best to utilize and apportion their resources, 
property, and facilities’ to strengthen the parishes.”295 According to the plan, three to four 
parishes in a cluster will share a single pastor. O’Malley justified the plan by citing the 
“mission entrusted to us by Jesus Christ”: “We are called to exercise prudential 
judgment…we are also called to be attentive to the present realities of our local Church 
and develop sustainable plans for the future. For that purpose, much time and effort has 
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been given to developing a pastoral plan for the Archdiocese.”296 Nevertheless, the plan 
is inevitably controversial as most parishioners feel close ties with their pastor and their 
congregation.  
Concluding Thoughts  
Despite these continuing financial questions, one must recall that a decade ago the 
Archdiocese was in “financial freefall.”297 As this project has demonstrated, the clergy 
abuse scandal and the financial crisis that it triggered forced the Archdiocese of Boston to 
overcome traditional issues in Catholic fundraising, namely a lack of financial 
transparency and accountability and a general ambivalence among clergy and 
parishioners toward money and fundraising. Through a series of critical steps that reflect 
best practices in Catholic and nonprofit fundraising—developing a marketing scheme that 
highlighted the real needs of the Archdiocese, achieving financial transparency, 
partnering with major donors, and adopting the best practices in nonprofit 
accountability—the Archdiocese of Boston experienced a “turn around” in its fundraising 
situation, and now serves as a model for other dioceses in the United States that are 
striving to improve their development efforts.  
The sense of betrayal and shame felt by parishioners as the clergy abuse scandal 
unfolded in 2002 certainly endures for many. The Archdiocese made gross mistakes in its 
handling of sexually abusive priests, and it will have to continue to deal with the 
multitude of consequences for such errancy for years to come. In my many conversations 
and email exchanges with those intimately involved in the Archdiocese’s development 
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efforts, however, I was continually struck by the passion these individuals have for their 
work and by the love they clearly have for the Church. As numerous articles have pointed 
out, raising money for the Archdiocese of Boston is one of the most difficult jobs in the 
city of Boston. Nevertheless, those in the Office of Institutional Advancement genuinely 
care about ensuring a future for the Archdiocese’s ministries and about establishing 
meaningful relationships with donors. They are also realistic about the Archdiocese’s 
shortcomings, and they never once tried to downplay the seriousness of the scandal. This 
final chapter has shown that there is still much work to be done in terms of maintaining 
current revenue levels and increasing the number of donors to the Catholic Appeal. While 
challenges remain for the fundraising efforts of Archdiocese, the sincerity is there—a 
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